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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2009, the world watched as Iranians took the online
services that some of us have come to regard as tools of procrastination—
services like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube—and turned them into tools
of cyber-democratization. The grassroots effort that came to be known as
Iran’s “Green Movement”1 materialized from a flurry of tweets, status
updates, and online videos. And when the Iranian government banned
foreign journalists, ordinary citizens disseminated grainy cell phone footage
of peaceful street protests and the government’s brutal response, filling the
void and keeping the world informed.2 Iconic images like the blank and
bloodied face of Neda Agha-Soltan captivated U.S. audiences and turned
1

The Green Movement has its roots in Iranian presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi’s “green
wave” campaign. See Hooman Majd, Think Again: Iran’s Green Movement, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 6,
2010), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/06/think_again_irans_green_movement. When
Mousavi lost the bid in what most observers considered a rigged election favoring incumbent Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, the campaign transformed into an election protest. Id. Today, the Green Movement is
increasingly viewed as an Iranian civil rights movement. See, e.g., Hamid Dabashi, Iran’s Younger,
Smarter Revolution, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 2, 2010, 1:37 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-andstories/2010-01-02/irans-younger-smarter-revolution/full (“For the last six months and since Day One of
this uprising . . . I have consistently called and continue to call it a civil-rights movement.”); Majd, supra
(“With every instance of recent government tyranny, from show trials of opposition politicians and
journalists to the beatings and murders of some demonstrators on Iran’s streets, the movement has
grown more steadfast in its demands for the rights of the people.”).
2
See, e.g., Jessica Reed, Updated: Citizen Journalism Round-up, GUARDIAN (June 15, 2009, 10:00
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/15/iran-election-protests-blogs.
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legions of casual observers into activists.3
Separated by oceans, continents, and a language barrier, these newly
minted activists seized on technology to bridge the gap. Liberation
technology4—specifically, tools allowing censorship bypass5 and user
anonymity—delivered a sort of twenty-first-century Underground Railroad.
One tool in particular, an anonymity network called Tor,6 quickly emerged
as a powerful ally to Persian Samizdat, helping Iranian protesters bypass
government censors while remaining safely anonymous.7 Tor allowed Iran’s
cyber-dissidents to voice their unmistakable demands for freedom and to
share with the outside world their firsthand accounts of the government’s
brutal response—all without revealing their online identities.
Today, the U.S.-based volunteers that comprise a significant segment
of Tor’s operator network8 face an uncertain legal landscape9 because Tor is
3

See Monica Hesse, Facebook’s Easy Virtue, WASH. POST, July 2, 2009, at C1 (noting that social
media activism surged following Neda’s death but suggesting that many of these activists may lack the
commitment necessary to effect tangible change); Jessica Ravitz, Neda: Latest Iconic Image to Inspire,
CNN WORLD (June 24, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-24/world/neda.iconic.images_1_nedaagha-soltan-tiananmen-square-iran.
4
Larry Diamond defines “liberation technology” as “any form of information and communication
technology . . . that can expand political social, and economic freedom.” Larry Diamond, Liberation
Technology, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2010, at 69, 70. He includes in this definition things like computers,
the Internet, and social networking websites. Id. To his list, I add censorship-bypass tools and
anonymizers.
5
As used in this Comment, the term “bypass” indicates software and online services that enable
Internet users to circumvent online censorship. Although “circumvention” is the term more often
employed in information-technology circles, I avoid it in an effort to minimize confusion with
“circumvention” as a legal term of art in the copyright context. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006))
(creating liability for “[c]ircumvention of copyright protection systems”).
6
Tor describes itself as “free software and an open network that helps you defend against a form of
network surveillance that threatens personal freedom and privacy, confidential business activities and
relationships, and state security known as traffic analysis.” Anonymity Online, TOR PROJECT,
https://www.torproject.org (last visited July 2, 2012).
7
Although this Comment focuses on the role of anonymity networks in enabling Iran’s protestersturned-journalists to disseminate information to a world audience without fear of government reprisal, a
separate benefit of anonymity lies beyond its scope: the role of anonymity in helping foreign activists
organize and disseminate information among themselves. This latter benefit was never realized in Iran,
where the news-disseminating power of social networking instead backfired against activists and
exposed them to the Iranian regime. See Evgeny Morozov, Iran: Downside to the “Twitter Revolution,”
DISSENT, Fall 2009, at 10, 12 (“[B]oth Twitter and Facebook give Iran’s secret services superb platforms
for gathering open source intelligence about the future revolutionaries, revealing how they are connected
to each other. . . . Once regimes used torture to get this kind of data; now it’s freely available on
Facebook.”).
8
Most Tor operators are located in the United States and Germany. Damon McCoy et al., Shining
Light in Dark Places: Understanding the Tor Network, in PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 63, 64
(Nikita Borisov & Ian Goldberg eds., 2008). Tor’s architecture is such that its volunteer-run network
could remain operational even after a complete shutdown of The Tor Project, Inc., the entity that
presently funds and develops Tor software. This Comment’s inquiry is therefore cabined to the potential
liability of Tor’s volunteer operators rather than that of The Tor Project.
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amenable to both legal and illegal usage. As countersurveillance expert
Richard Abbott has observed, “[m]any dismiss [Tor] as a den of thieves and
pedophiles” while “[o]thers describe it as a beacon of democracy able to
free the individual from oppression.”10 This Comment ponders the “den of
thieves” allegation and considers one particular form of theft, copyright
infringement. I argue that Tor operators—individuals who donate computer
resource and bandwidth to make the Tor network possible—should not be
held secondarily liable for the infringing activities of Tor users—
individuals who send Internet traffic through the Tor network in an effort to
mask their online identities and bypass government censorship of the
Internet.11
Because the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)12 was not
drafted with Tor in mind and because no anonymity network operator has
yet faced secondary liability in a copyright infringement action, it is unclear
whether Tor’s volunteer operators will be exempt from liability under
DMCA § 512(a), a provision giving safe harbor to transitory digital
network communication providers.13 And even though a global network like
Tor could theoretically continue to function without any U.S.-based
operators, the specter of infringement liability for these Tor operators is
troubling because, at a minimum, it discourages the largest population of
uncensored Internet users from volunteering as anonymity network
operators.14
9

Christopher Riley, The Need for Software Innovation Policy, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
589, 607 (2007) (“The legal status of Tor is far from clear.”).
10
Richard Abbott, An Onion a Day Keeps the NSA Away, J. INTERNET L., May 2010, at 22, 22.
11
Tor is a volunteer-run network of computers that form a series of virtual tunnels through which
Internet users can send and receive data anonymously. Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT,
http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited July 2, 2012). This Comment uses the
term “operator” to refer to an individual who installs Tor software on her computer for the benefit of
others. The individual becomes one “stop” along the virtual Tor tunnel, encrypting data transmissions
and handing them off to the next operator for further encryption—a process that anonymizes data and
allows it to bypass any government-imposed censoring of the Internet. See id. (using the technical term
“relay” instead of “operator”). By contrast, a “user” is an individual who installs Tor software for
personal benefit: an Iranian blogger who seeks anonymity from prying government eyes; a Chinese
college student who wants to get around the “Great Firewall of China”—a government censorship
scheme that blocks access to websites like Facebook and Google; an American who is worried about
identity theft. See What Is a Tor Relay? ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/torchallenge/whatis-tor (last visited July 2, 2012); Inception, TOR PROJECT, http://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.
en (last visited July 2, 2011). The distinction between Tor operators and users is explored in further
detail infra Part I.C.
12
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)).
13
For further discussion of DMCA § 512(a), see infra Part III.
14
The CIA reports that, as of 2008, the United States was second only to China in the number of
Internet users. The World Factbook—Country Comparison :: Internet Users, CIA, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2153rank.html (last visited July 2,
2012).
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Recent litigation suggests that, in the near future, Tor operators may
find themselves defendants in copyright infringement suits arising from
illegal file-sharing activity. The year 2010 saw the opening salvos of
massive copyright litigation involving the popular file-sharing protocol
BitTorrent.15 In a move reminiscent of the recording industry’s unpopular
onslaught against individual file sharers in the early 2000s, independent
filmmakers began pursuing tens of thousands of BitTorrent users who
allegedly shared copies of films like The Hurt Locker.16 The filmmakers’
strategy involved subpoenaing Internet service providers (ISPs) to identify
users based on Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.17 Although ISP delay tactics
ultimately forced the filmmakers to voluntarily dismiss 90% of their
defendants, more than 2300 unnamed defendants remain in the suit,18 and
the Hurt Locker litigation is but one of many mass copyright infringement
actions against alleged BitTorrent users.19 It seems inevitable that,
15

BitTorrent is an Internet communication protocol that allows individuals to share large files
quickly and easily. What Is BitTorrent and Why Are Its Users Being Sued?, THE TELEGRAPH (May 24,
2011, 2:21 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8533353/What-is-BitTorrent-and-why-are-itsusers-being-sued.html. Several BitTorrent-based file-sharing programs exist, including the popular
“μTorrent” and “Vuze” (formerly called “Azureus”). See Results for “File Sharing,” CNET.COM, http://
download.cnet.com/1770-2196_4-0.html?query=file+sharing&searchtype=downloads (last visited July
2, 2012). Two features distinguish BitTorrent from other file-sharing protocols: (1) BitTorrent breaks
large files (like movies) into “chunks” for faster downloading and (2) it connects users directly to each
other (rather than to a centralized server). See What Is BitTorrent and Why Are Its Users Being Sued?,
supra. The absence of a centralized server is of legal import as copyright holders seeking legal redress
for alleged infringement must bring separate suits against each individual file sharer—there is no
Napster- or LimeWire-esque corporate middleman to sue. See id.
16
See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 45 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying a
motion brought by putative defendants seeking to quash plaintiff’s subpoenas issued to their ISPs,
denying putative defendants’ request for a protective order, and denying their motion to dismiss for
improper joinder or want of personal jurisdiction); Eriq Gardner, “Hurt Locker” Lawsuit Target [sic]
Pirates, REUTERS (May 11, 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/12/us-hurtlockeridUSTRE64B0AU20100512 (explaining that the plaintiff in these lawsuits, U.S. Copyright Group, had
previously filed approximately ten other suits alleging piracy of other films).
17
See Voltage Pictures, 818 F. Supp. 2d at 30–31. An “IP address” is a unique number, assigned by
an ISP, identifying an Internet-connected computer. Although IP addresses alone do not contain
personally identifiable information, ISPs are able to link them to customer accounts to provide claimants
with the necessary identification. See Fact Sheet 18: Online Privacy: Using the Internet Safely, PRIVACY
RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs18-cyb.htm (last updated July 2, 2012). IP
addresses can, however, convey meaningful information about a user’s geographic location—a
phenomenon called “geolocation.” See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet Commerce,
and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALBANY L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 61, 67–68 (2011) (describing how IP address data can reveal a user’s location within a
thirty-mile radius).
18
See enigmax, Record-Breaking BitTorrent Lawsuit Decimated, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.torrentfreak.com/90-of-defendants-dismissed-from-record-breaking-bittorrent-lawsuit110930.
19
See, e.g., Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–23, No. 11–cv–15231, 2012 WL 1019034, at *1
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2012) (“This case is one among many cases filed nationwide by copyright owners
alleging that John Doe defendants downloaded their films without authorization using a peer-to-peer
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eventually, some of the IP addresses subpoenaed in these BitTorrent
lawsuits will identify innocent Tor operators who, because of the nature of
this anonymity technology, will erroneously appear to be the sources of any
infringing activity that passes through their virtual tunnels.
This Comment focuses on the threat of infringement litigation faced by
Tor operators. Nevertheless, conclusions reached here should also extend to
operators of other decentralized, volunteer-run online networks that
primarily function as tools for bypassing censorship and anonymizing
online activity. Tor is not unique, but it is the “most public and widespread
anonymity network.”20 Indeed, a recent Harvard study analyzing bypasstool usage in Iran, China, and other countries with substantial government
censorship of the Internet found Tor to be one of the most popular tools as
measured by unique monthly users.21 And because Tor technology has
broad implications across such diverse areas as law enforcement, online
privacy, and net neutrality,22 the legal status of its operator network is all the
more worthy of examination.23
Using the Iranian uprising of 2009 as a case study, this Comment
argues that Tor operators should be shielded from secondary infringement
liability so that they can continue to facilitate speech in heavily censored
nations. In doing so, Tor operators can improve U.S. access to world news
and nurture the development of democratic habits abroad. Part I describes
how Iranian citizen journalists and the global online community worked in
tandem to smuggle news out of Iran amid a mainstream media blackout and
despite the Iranian regime’s best iron-fisted efforts to stifle what it viewed
as dissent. These events did not go unnoticed in the United States, and Part
(‘P2P’) file sharing network known as BitTorrent.” (footnote omitted)); see also houstonlawy3r, What to
Do About These Smaller Doe Bittorrent Cases?, FED. COMPUTER CRIMES (Aug. 26, 2011), https://
torrentlawyer.wordpress.com/2011/08/26/small-doe-bittorrent-cases-in-home-state (“The bittorrent
cases are speeding up, both in number of cases filed, and in the issues relating to the cases.”).
20
Abbott, supra note 10, at 26.
21
See HAL ROBERTS ET AL., HARV. U. BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 2010
CIRCUMVENTION TOOL USAGE REPORT 9 (2010), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.
law.harvard.edu/files/2010_Circumvention_Tool_Usage_Report.pdf.
22
“Net neutrality” (short for “network neutrality”) is a network design principle rooted in the
assumption that public information networks are maximally useful when they are content-agnostic. See
Network Neutrality FAQ, TIMWU.ORG, http://www.timwu.org/network_neutrality.html (last visited July
2, 2012). In other words, the social and economic utility of a network (like the Internet) increases as
network accessibility increases, allowing all types of digital interactions to flow freely. Id. Professor
Tim Wu draws a helpful analogy to electrical grids: the grid is an implicitly neutral network because it
“does not care if you plug in a toaster, an iron, or a computer”; this neutrality has allowed the grid to
“survive[] and support[] giant waves of innovation in the appliance market.” Id. Proponents of Internet
neutrality argue for similar open-access regulations while critics maintain that open access will “slow
the pace of broadband deployment.” Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141, 141 (2003).
23
Abbott, supra note 10, at 22 (“[A]n understanding of Tor will affect every Internet discussion you
will ever have. Learn to use Tor effectively and you will find yourself . . . chuckling as the naïve and
uninitiated debate net neutrality, wiretapping, packet inspection, and other such anachronisms.”).
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I further explores key U.S. legislative and executive reactions to Iran’s socalled “Twitter Revolution.”24 Finally, Part I discusses the role of
anonymity network Tor during the Iranian uprising and explains how this
technology is amenable to both infringing and noninfringing uses.
Part II paints a picture of Tor litigation as it is likely to emerge—in the
context of illegal file sharing made untraceable by the union of Tor and
BitTorrent. This Part describes potential theories of liability, concluding
that (absent safe harbor immunity) a theory of contributory infringement is
the likeliest to prevail against a Tor operator whose service allegedly
facilitates copyright infringement.
Part III addresses statutory safe harbor under the DMCA, arguing that
Tor operators, like many Internet service providers, should enjoy § 512(a)
safe harbor protection from monetary liability in a copyright infringement
action. Tor operators meet § 512’s general conditions of eligibility and
specifically qualify for immunity under § 512(a) as mere conduits of digital
communication. Part III explains how this statutory defense, which failed
file-sharing defendants like Napster, can prevail for Tor operators.
The statutory safe harbor shields defendants from monetary liability
only and would leave Tor operators vulnerable to injunctive action
following a finding of copyright infringement.25 Anticipating the balancing
of interests that would confront a court in deciding whether to grant such
equitable relief, Part IV argues that the likely harm to a Tor operator’s First
Amendment interests militates against the use of injunctive remedies. By
allowing speakers to disseminate news free from persecution, the operator
exercises a protected right to receive information, and this speechfacilitating conduct is itself a form of speech warranting protection.
I. BACKGROUND
Internet freedom abroad is deeply entwined with U.S. foreign policy
objectives ranging from human rights and freedom of expression to broader
goals of democratization.26 But the Internet and its “vast democratic
forums”27 remain quite vulnerable to censorship and perversion by

24

Early mainstream media reports were quick to credit the micro-blogging service Twitter with
fueling prodemocratic unrest in Iran. With hindsight, observers have come to view this characterization
of Twitter’s role as hyperbolic. See, e.g., Morozov, supra note 7, at 10 (describing the U.S.-mediaconstructed narrative of events in Iran as “Iran’s Twitter Revolution”); infra note 48 and accompanying
text (discussing the debate, largely initiated by Malcolm Gladwell, over the role of social networking in
Iran’s 2009 uprising).
25
See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
26
See Internet Freedom, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cip/netfreedom (last visited July
2, 2012) (reconfirming the State Department’s commitment to “defense of a free, open, and
interconnected Internet as a U.S. foreign policy priority”).
27
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (striking down a portion of the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 on First Amendment overbreadth grounds).
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oppressive governments. States like China,28 Saudi Arabia,29 and Iran30 have
long used the Internet to stifle dissent. And more recently in 2011, popular
uprisings across the Arab world have set the region ablaze and brought the
interplay of digital communication and democratization into sharp public
focus.31 In these places, blogging—arguably the apotheosis of free speech in
the digital age—is often met with a gauntlet of online censorship,
government surveillance, and licensing schemes32 designed to silence
dissent. Through the lens of Iran’s 2009 uprising, this Part explores the
problem of Internet censorship in Iran, key U.S. legislative and executive
28

For example, in 2005, Chinese users of Microsoft’s MSN Spaces blogging service learned that
the company had bowed to their government’s censorship scheme by blocking blog titles that used terms
like “freedom” and “democracy.” JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 95
(2006). Goldsmith and Wu point to China as an example of “what a government that really wants to
control Internet communications can accomplish.” Id. at 89. For a discussion of Chinese censorship and
circumvention efforts, see Jennifer Shyu, Comment, Speak No Evil: Circumventing Chinese Censorship,
45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211, 225–29, 240–43 (2008).
29
The Saudi censorship machine is extensive but less aggressive than China’s. GOLDSMITH & WU,
supra note 28, at 74. The Saudi government-owned Internet infrastructure can filter and block all web
traffic flowing into the Kingdom. Id. According to a 2004 OpenNet Initiative report, some of the most
aggressively blocked websites were those providing “information about tools to circumvent the
government’s filtering, and sites that promote[d] religious dialogue between Muslims and Christians.”
Id.
30
Iran is discussed infra Part I.A.
31
For example, the Egyptian government took the radical step of shutting down all Internet service
following mass anti-Mubarak protests in January 2011. See David Kravets, Egypt’s Last-Standing ISP
Goes Dark, WIRED (Jan. 31, 2011, 6:55 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/01/egypt-ispshuttered. When service was restored, the global online community mobilized to help Egyptian
protesters safely reconnect to the outside world through Tor. See, e.g., phobos, Protecting Your Internet
Traffic in Volatile Times, TOR BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/protecting-yourinternet-traffic-volatile-times (encouraging readers to “join the Tor network to help others” remain
anonymous and expressing concern over the possibility that Egyptian Internet traffic “is being recorded
and possibly saved for future use”); Susannah Vila, 5 Things You Can Do to Support Egyptians from
Anywhere, MOVEMENTS.ORG (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.movements.org/blog/entry/egypt-what-canyou-do (encouraging readers to help Egyptians browse the Internet anonymously by running a Tor
relay). Recognizing the role of social networking in securing Mubarak’s eventual ouster, one grateful
Egyptian man went so far as to name his daughter “Facebook.” See David Murphy, Egyptian Man
Names Daughter ‘Facebook,’ PCMAG.COM (Feb. 20, 2011, 10:37 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,2817,2380670,00.asp.
32
For a discussion of the proposed Saudi licensing scheme, see Alexia Tsotsis, Saudi Arabians Will
Soon Need a License to Blog, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.techcrunch.com/2010/09/23/
saudi-arabians-will-soon-need-a-license-to-blog (“[A]ll Saudi Arabian web publishers and online media,
including blogs and forums, will need to be officially registered with the government.”). Saudi bloggers
already face ill-defined ex post criminal liability for posting content that violates social or religious
“values.” See, e.g., Blogger Fouad al Farhan Freed After More than Four Months in Prison,
REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES (Apr. 28, 2008), http://en.rsf.org/IMG/article_PDF/saudi-arabia-bloggerfouad-al-farhan-freed-28-04-2008,26746.pdf (“[B]logger Fouad al Farhan . . . had been held in prison
since 10 December 2007[] for posting an article on his blog discussing the ‘advantages’ and
‘disadvantages’ of being a Muslim.”). For a comprehensive report on Internet censorship and
surveillance in Saudi Arabia, see ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN
CYBERSPACE 561–570 (Ronald Diebert el al. eds., 2010).
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reactions to this problem, and the salutary role played by the anonymity
network Tor.
A. Iran: The Middle East’s Largest Prison for Journalists and Netizens33
“Control has no meaning on the Internet . . . . It would crash like the
Berlin Wall.”
–Shaban Shahidi Moadab, Deputy Press Minister,
Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance34
Sadly for the Iranian civil rights movement, it is Mr. Shahidi Moadab’s
prophecy—not control over the Internet—that has “crashed.” The Islamic
Republic of Iran boasts one of the world’s most comprehensive and
sophisticated Internet censorship machines.35 Theirs is an attempted
panoptic use of the Internet, designed to induce self-censorship.36
Iran routes all web traffic through a government-run Internet backbone,
allowing the regime to target and block content relating to human rights,
women’s rights, political reform, government criticism, religious minorities,
criticism of Islam, sexuality, and a broad range of topics it considers
immoral.37 Iran’s Press Law38 further restricts speech through a licensing
33

REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, WORLD DAY AGAINST CYBER CENSORSHIP 20 (2010),
http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf (“With some sixty journalists and bloggers behind bars
and another fifty forced to seek asylum elsewhere, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become the largest
prison in the Middle East—and one of the world’s largest prisons—for journalists and netizens.”).
Merriam-Webster defines “netizen” as “an active participant in the online community of the Internet.”
Netizen, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/netizen (last visited July 2,
2011).
34
Mr. Shahidi Moadab was quoted in Nazila Fathi, Taboo Surfing: Click Here for Iran . . ., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at C5 (internal quotation marks omitted). There, the author mistakenly identified
the speaker as “Shaaban Sahidi.” See id.
35
DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 555.
36
For a discussion of the Foucauldian reinterpretation of Bentham’s Panopticon in the context of
government surveillance and censorship in Iran and China, see Cameron J. Shahab & Reza Mousoli, Cat
and Mouse in Cyberspace: A Case Study of China vs Iran, IRANIAN.COM (Sept. 10, 2010), http://
www.iranian.com/main/2010/sep/cat-and-mouse-cyberspace. Michel Foucault, who visited Iran during
the height of the 1978 anti-Shah protests, was highly critical of the Shah’s secret police and their
surveillance tactics. See JANET AFARY & KEVIN B. ANDERSON, FOUCAULT AND THE IRANIAN
REVOLUTION 2 (2005); Shahab & Mousoli, supra.
37
DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 553–55. The Iranian regime is also working on its very own,
“clean” version of the Internet—“an insular nationwide intranet that is reportedly isolated from the
regular Internet” and that “would be heavily regulated by the government.” Ryan Paul, Iran Moving
Ahead with Plans for National Intranet, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 9, 2012, 10:10 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2012/04/iran-plans-to-unplug-the-internet-launch-its-ownclean-alternative.ars.
38
QANUNI MATBU’AT [PRESS LAW] Tehran 1381 [2002], arts. 1, 6 (Iran) (defining “press” as
including “[a]ll electronic publications” and explaining that “[t]he [p]ress is free, except for items which
undermine Islam’s bases and commandments, and public and private rights”), translated in Iran Data
Portal—Press Law, PRINCETON UNIV., http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/legislation/press-law
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scheme that puts bloggers and website operators under government
regulatory authority.39 Unlicensed speakers face criminal prosecution and
punishment for speech-based crimes ranging from imprisonment to death.40
Such harsh consequences create a very real need for anonymity technology
to shield bloggers’ IP addresses and hence their identities.41
Perhaps as a testament to its fractured leadership, the run-up to Iran’s
hotly disputed June 2009 presidential election saw a surge in online
censorship targeting prominent political figures including former President
Mohammad Khatami42 and presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi.43
In the election aftermath, amid street demonstrations and widespread
allegations of vote-rigging, the Iranian censors launched an undeclared war
on social networking.44 With the foreign press almost entirely banned from
reporting on the election fallout,45 the task of documenting this historic
clash fell to Iran’s citizen journalists.46 Their contraband—uncensored
(last updated Aug. 3, 2011).
39
DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 550; see also Article 19, Memorandum on Media Regulation in
the Islamic Republic of Iran 8–9, UNHCR REFWORLD (May 2, 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/475e4e270.html (discussing the Iranian licensing scheme and characterizing it as both a “matter of
serious concern” and “a violation of the right to freedom of expression”). For a discussion of regulatory
restrictions faced by Middle Eastern bloggers, see Mohamed Abdel Dayem, Middle East Bloggers: The
Street Leads Online, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.cpj.org/reports/2009/10/middle-east-bloggers-the-street-leads-online.php.
40
Punishable offenses include insulting Islam and criticizing state officials. DIEBERT ET AL., supra
note 32, at 550; see also TA’AZIRAT [PENAL CODE] Tehran 1991, arts. 513–514, 609 (Iran), available at
http://mehr.org/Islamic_Penal_Code_of_Iran.pdf (last visited July 2, 2010) (criminalizing speech that
insults, inter alia, “the Islamic sanctities or any of the imams,” the Prophet Muhammad, or “the leaders
of the three branches of the government”).
41
Ethan Zuckerman, a researcher at Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society,
has developed a guide for anonymous blogging that combines Tor, the blogging platform WordPress,
and the use of free email accounts to produce a “very high level of anonymity.” Ethan Zuckerman,
Anonymous Blogging with Wordpress & Tor, GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE (Sept. 4, 2009, 6:03 PM), http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/projects/guide.
42
For example, Iran began blocking access to Khatami’s website yarinews.org in February 2009.
DIEBERT ET AL., supra note 32, at 553.
43
See id. (explaining that “[m]any believe that supporters of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
were behind the blocking orders” targeting Facebook, as opposition candidate “Mousavi[] had been
using Facebook for political organizing”).
44
See REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 33, at 19 (“Iran’s regime considers social
networks to be instruments of the opposition. Facebook and Twitter, which relayed the calls for
demonstrations, have been continuously blocked since June 2009. MySpace.com and Orkut.com have
received the same treatment.”).
45
Chaos Prevails as Protesters, Police Clash in Iranian Capital, CNN.COM (June 21, 2009,
4:37AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/20/iran.election/index.html [hereinafter Chaos
Prevails] (“The Ministry of Culture on Saturday banned international media from reporting on the
demonstrations unless they receive permission from Iranian authorities. A freelance journalist said it was
‘very dangerous’ to take pictures.”).
46
A message on losing presidential candidate Mousavi’s Facebook page, posted during the height
of the June 2009 postelection protests, captured this sentiment: “Today you are the media . . . . It is your
duty to report and keep the hope alive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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accounts of peaceful street protests and a brutal government response—
found its way to U.S. consumers thanks (in part) to cell phone technology,
YouTube, and the volunteer efforts of world netizens who posted,
retweeted, and shared news with the wired community.47 And although the
significance of social networking in aiding communication and activism
within Iran is in dispute,48 there can be little doubt that these tools played a
crucial role in getting unfiltered news out of Iran.49 Citizen journalism
would be of little use without an effective news dissemination mechanism,
and effective dissemination is precisely what the online community
delivered. Netizens ensured that when the Iranian government killed
peaceful protester Neda Agha-Soltan50 in cold blood and in broad daylight,
the YouTube-connected world was watching.51
To the Iranian government, these amateur videographers and other
citizen journalists were dissidents, and their methods of news dissemination

47

Former deputy national security adviser Mark Pfeifle went so far as to suggest that Twitter might
deserve a Nobel Peace Prize for having “uniquely documented and personalized the story of hope,
heroism, and horror in Iran.” Mark Pfeifle, A Nobel Peace Prize for Twitter?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 6, 2009, at 22, 22.
48
Malcolm Gladwell is perhaps the most vocal critic of the idea that social networking can effect
real social change. Regarding the role of Twitter in Iran’s post-election uprising, he observed that “the
people tweeting about the demonstrations were almost all in the West.” Malcolm Gladwell, Small
Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, at 42, 44. For Twitter
co-founder Biz Stone’s response to Gladwell, see Biz Stone, Exclusive: Biz Stone on Twitter and
Activism, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2010, 8:19 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2010/10/
exclusive-biz-stone-on-twitter-and-activism/64772 (“Twitter users played their roles in . . . the political
unrest in Iran but Mr. Gladwell is keen to downplay their efforts—and the fact that former nationalsecurity adviser Mark Pfeifle called for Twitter to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize seems only to
have ruffled his feathers.”). Stone argues that the “leaderless, self-organizing systems” that Gladwell
dismissed as incapable of truly challenging the status quo are instead “the very embodiment of change”
because they lower the bar to activism and allow individuals to act as one toward a common goal. Id.
49
See, e.g., Sara Ledwith, Iran’s Neda Shows Citizen Journalism Unleashed, REUTERS (June 23,
2009, 2:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55M3AJ20090623 (“Since Reuters and other
foreign media are subject to Iranian restrictions on their ability to report, film or take pictures in Tehran,
they increasingly depend on people like the one on whose cameraphone Neda’s death was recorded.”).
50
Neda, whose name in Persian means “voice,” became the voice of Iran’s freedom movement. See
Times Topics: Neda Agha-Soltan, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2009), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/
reference/timestopics/people/s/neda_agha_soltan/index.html. The story of Neda’s life, her videorecorded death, and her enduring legacy are well-told in the HBO documentary film For Neda. For a
synopsis, see HBO: For Neda: Synopsis, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/documentaries/for-neda/index.
html#/documentaries/for-neda/synopsis.html (last visited July 2, 2012).
51
The grainy cell phone video of Neda’s death is widely available online. See, e.g., Xeni Jardin,
Iran: Neda (Warning: Graphic Video), BOINGBOING (June 21, 2009, 11:50 AM), http://www.
boingboing.net/2009/06/21/iran-neda-warning-gr.html#previouspost. On the day of Neda’s death,
President Barack Obama warned the Iranian government that the world was, indeed, watching. See Press
Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement of the President on Iran (June 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statement-from-the-President-on-Iran
(“The
Iranian
government must understand that the world is watching. We mourn each and every innocent life that is
lost. We call on the Iranian government to stop all violent and unjust actions against its own people.”).
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were tools of subversion.52 Blogger Jila Bani Yaghoob, winner of the 2010
“Reporters Without Borders Freedom of Expression” award, was arrested
along with her husband and twenty other journalists during an election
protest.53 She was sentenced to one year in prison and was banned from
working as a journalist for the next thirty years, and her husband received a
five-year prison sentence.54 Other activists soon learned that even their
instant messaging activity—an ostensibly private mode of
communication—could land them in jail.55 As of March 30, 2012, the
Threatened Voices project was actively tracking 316 Iranian bloggers who
had been threatened or arrested by the Iranian government.56
The postelection wave of arrests57 is perhaps not surprising in light of
Iran’s robust online surveillance apparatus,58 which is aided by Western
technology,59 and Iran’s well-documented animosity toward press
freedom.60 Nevertheless, these arrests helped shine a floodlight on the
52

REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 33, at 19 (discussing Iranian Internet filtration,
surveillance, blogger arrests, cyber-dissidence, and the government’s desire to “block the transmission
via the Internet of photos taken with a cell phone”).
53
Cracking Down Remorselessly, Tehran Shows Its True Face, REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES
(Oct. 28, 2010), http://en.rsf.org/iran-cracking-down-remorselessly-tehran-28-10-2010,38693.html.
54
Id.
55
Internet Filtering in Iran, OPENNET INITIATIVE 7 (June 16, 2009), http://opennet.net/sites/
opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf (“Women’s rights activists reported that they were shown
transcripts of instant messaging sessions by authorities after their arrest, which, if true, would support
the existence of an advanced surveillance program.”).
56
Threatened Voices—Iran, GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE, http://threatened.globalvoicesonline.org/
bloggers/iran (last visited July 2, 2012). These statistics reveal a sharp increase in blogger arrests
beginning in 2009. Id.; see also Press Freedom Violations Recounted in Real Time (from July to
December 2010), REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, http://en.rsf.org/iran-press-freedom-violationsrecounted-09-09-2010,37863.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011) (cataloging the legal entanglements of
Iranian journalists and bloggers).
57
See, e.g., REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, supra note 33 (discussing the postelection arrests of
blogger and human rights activist Shiva Nazar Ahrari as well as cyber-dissident Mojtaba Lotfi).
58
See Internet Filtering in Iran, supra note 55, at 6 (“Iran is reportedly investing in improving its
technical capacity to extensively monitor the behavior of its citizens on the Internet. The routing of
Internet traffic through proxy servers offers the potential for monitoring and logging essentially all
unencrypted Web traffic, including e-mail, instant messaging and browsing. The architecture of the
Iranian Internet is particularly conducive to widespread surveillance as all traffic from the dozens of
ISPs serving households is routed through the state-controlled telecommunications infrastructure . . . .”).
59
See id. at 6–7 (“In 2008, two European companies reportedly sold a sophisticated electronic
surveillance system capable of monitoring Internet use that could be utilized for tracking and monitoring
the online activities of human rights organizations and political dissidents. [The state-controlled
Telecommunication Company of Iran] is said to have received the equipment from Nokia Siemens
Networks, a joint venture between the Finnish cell phone maker and the German company Siemens.”).
60
Iran ranks a miserable 172 out of 175 on the Reporters Sans Frontières Press Freedom Index,
owing to its “[a]utomatic prior censorship, state surveillance of journalists, mistreatment, journalists
forced to flee the country, illegal arrests and imprisonment.” Press Freedom Index 2009, REPORTERS
SANS FRONTIÈRES, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html (last visited July 2, 2012). Iran
is at the “gates of the infernal trio” occupied by Turkmenistan, North Korea, and Eritrea—places “where
the media are so suppressed they are non-existent.” Id.
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importance of unfiltered Internet access and online anonymity to U.S.
democratization efforts abroad and U.S. access to world news; likewise, the
arrests focused attention on the role to be played by volunteer-operated
anonymity networks like Tor.61
B. The Official U.S. Reaction
Twitter’s role in the Iranian story garnered so much media attention62
that on June 16, 2009, the U.S. State Department asked the website to delay
its scheduled maintenance in an effort to keep the service available to
Iranian protesters.63 The following month, the U.S. Senate added the
Victims of Iranian Censorship (VOICE) Act to a defense spending bill
authorizing up to $50 million in federal funding “to help Iranians evade
their government’s attempts to censor the Internet.”64 Enacted in October
2009, the VOICE Act explicitly authorizes spending to “develop additional
proxy server capabilit[ies] and anti-censorship software” so that users in
Iran may bypass Iranian government censorship of U.S.-funded Persianlanguage news websites.65
The VOICE Act also created the Iranian Electronic Education,
Exchange, and Media Fund, a U.S. Treasury fund, to facilitate the
development of technologies that will help the Iranian people “gain access
to and share information; . . . exercise freedom of speech, freedom of
expression, and freedom of assembly through the Internet and other
electronic media; . . . and . . . counter efforts . . . to block, censor, and
monitor the Internet.”66 Recent changes to U.S. export regulations continued
61

See, e.g., Cyrus Farivar, How Geeks (and Non-Geeks) Can Help Iranians Online, FRONTLINE
(July 17, 2009, 2:36 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2009/07/how-geeksand-non-geeks-can-help-iranians-online.html (“[T]here already is a growing legion of people worldwide
who are helping Iranians improve access to the heavily-filtered and significantly slower [Iranian]
Internet. Some have installed a piece of software called Tor on their home computers.”).
62
See Morozov, supra note 7, at 10 (“In the first days after the protests, it was hard to find a
television network or a newspaper . . . that didn’t run a feature or an editorial extolling the role of
Twitter in fomenting and publicizing the Iranian protests.”).
63
See Daily Press Briefing, Ian Kelly, Spokesman, U.S. Department of State (June 16, 2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/jun/124991.htm; Sue Pleming, U.S. State
Department Speaks to Twitter over Iran, REUTERS (June 16, 2009, 3:26 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSWBT01137420090616 (“The U.S. State Department said on
Tuesday it had contacted the social networking service Twitter to urge it to delay a planned upgrade that
would have cut daytime service to Iranians who are disputing their election.”). More than one year after
the election protests, the State Department continued to recognize the ability of social networking to
foment social change. See, e.g., Reza Aslan, Tweeting to Iran, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 20, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/20/tweeting-to-iran.html (reporting that the State
Department launched its own Persian-language Twitter feed).
64
Eli Lake, Senate OKs Funds to Help Thwart Iran Web Censors: Measure Aims to Circumvent
“Cruel Regime,” WASH. TIMES, July 26, 2009, at A1.
65
Victims of Iranian Censorship Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1261–1266, 123 Stat. 2190, 2553–55
(2009) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6201, 6204 (2006)).
66
Id. § 1263(c). In 2010, the House of Representatives considered, but ultimately did not pass, a
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in a similar vein, “authorizing the exportation of certain Internet-based
personal communications services and software,” such as social networking
and blogging services, to Iran.67
U.S. investment in Iranian democratization predates the 2009 election
uprising. The State Department spent $31 million in 2007 and appropriated
another $60 million in 2008, all with the goal of promoting free speech and
democracy in Iran.68 These funds enabled Voice of America Broadcasting to
invest in a Tor-embedded, Persian-language version of the Firefox web
browser.69 Tor, in turn, allowed Iranian dissidents to access governmentblocked websites, evade government detection, and generally “give
Ahmadinejad’s Web censors headaches.”70
C. Tor: What Lawyers Should Know About Onion Routing
Tor primarily bills itself as a privacy and civil liberties tool (rather than
a way of bypassing censorship71) and it discourages use of the Tor network
for file-sharing purposes.72 Tor uses “onion routing”—a technology
originally developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory to protect
government communications.73 Tor anonymizes74 its users’ Internet activity
related bill calling for the creation of an Internet Freedom Foundation. The foundation would have
awarded grants to “develop deployable technologies to defeat Internet suppression and censorship” by
foreign governments. Internet Freedom Act of 2010, H.R. 4784, 111th Cong. §§ 3, 5 (2010).
67
Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Sudanese Sanctions Regulations; Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,997, 10,998 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 560); see also
Mark Landler, U.S. Hopes Exports of Internet Services Will Help Open Closed Societies, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2010, at A4 (discussing the Obama Administration’s decision to allow the exporting of online
services to Iran). For a discussion of the First Amendment implications of U.S.–Iran trade sanctions, see
infra note 212 and accompanying text.
68
Eli Lake, Protestors Use Navy Technology to Avoid Censorship, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 2010, at
A1. Lake quoted former State Department Iran democracy program coordinator David Denehy, who
said the program’s goal was “to promote freedom of speech for Iranians to communicate with each other
and the outside world.” Id.
69
Id. Tor is now available as a component of the Tor Browser Bundle for the Firefox browser. See
Tor Project: Torbutton, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/torbutton (last updated Dec. 17,
2011).
70
Lake, supra note 68 (quoting Wired.com’s national security blog editor, Noah Schachtman)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
71
See Roger Dingledine, Ten Things To Look For in a Circumvention Tool, TOR PROJECT 6 (Sept.
16, 2010), https://www.torproject.org/press/presskit/2010-09-16-circumvention-features.pdf (explaining
that publicity, while beneficial, can attract the ire of censors who may choose to block a particular tool
merely to create a repressive veneer and induce self-censorship).
72
See Elec. Frontier Found., Legal FAQ for Tor Relay Operators, TOR PROJECT,
http://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-legal-faq.html.en (last updated Aug. 24, 2011) [hereinafter EFF, Legal
FAQ] (advising against the use of Tor for illegal purposes and explaining that “Tor has been developed
to be a tool for free expression, privacy, and human rights”); Tor FAQ, TOR PROJECT, https://www.
torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en (last visited July 2, 2012) (explaining that the Tor service is slow in part
because many users “don’t understand or care that Tor can’t currently handle file-sharing traffic load”).
73
Inception, supra note 11; see also Brief Selected History, ONION ROUTING, http://www.onionrouter.net/History.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (chronicling a brief selected history of onion routing,
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by funneling web traffic through a series of encrypted virtual tunnels.75
These tunnels are made possible by a distributed, volunteer-run network of
Tor operators—individuals who run Tor software on their computers for the
benefit of others.76 New operators join, and thereby expand, the Tor network
with the understanding that their efforts can help protect the anonymity of
endangered citizen journalists and human rights activists in countries like
Iran and China.77
As information travels from one Tor operator’s tunnel to another, the
software adds a new “layer” of encryption (hence the onion metaphor) such
that no operator in the circuit can ever trace the transmission back more
than one layer, protecting the Tor user who initiated it.78 Tor operators
called “relay nodes” pass information along the circuit and an “exit node”
operator hands off the transmission to the user’s intended destination.79 That
destination might be a website, an instant messaging server, or any other
online service that users wish to access without revealing their true IP
addresses.80 From the destination’s perspective, the transmission appears to
come directly from the exit node; indeed the transmission bears the exit
node operator’s IP address.81
The Tor network’s decentralized architecture and its reliance on
volunteer operators are of potential legal import and therefore deserve
further explanation. Centralized networks route all user activity through
computers operated by a single entity.82 Perhaps the most famous example
from its origins in 1995 as a project funded by the Office of Naval Research through 2004, when U.S.
government ceased funding Tor). The name “Tor” derives from an acronym, T.O.R. signifying “The
Onion Router.” See Tor Project: FAQ, supra note 72.
74
Achieving anonymity, in the Internet context, requires a two-pronged approach. First, the user
must establish an anonymous Internet connection (one that does not reveal the user’s unique IP address).
This capability is the province of Tor and other anonymity services. Second, users must anonymize the
contents of their communications. Users who interact with websites that offer transport layer security or
“TLS” (indicated by the use of “https://” instead of “http://”) enjoy this type of anonymity. See, e.g.,
Abbott, supra note 10, at 24 (discussing TLS in the context of a Tor user who visits https://secure.
wikileaks.org).
75
Tor: Overview, supra note 11. For a brief video illustrating this process, see Conrad Warre, How
Tor Works, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.technologyreview.com/video/?vid=315.
76
Tor: Overview, supra note 11.
77
See Inception, supra note 11; What Is a Tor Relay?, supra note 11 (“Working together, we can
improve the network for everyone and protect the anonymity of Tor users all over the world.”).
78
See Abbott, supra note 10, at 23 (explaining how Tor builds multiple circuits thereby ensuring
that “no one person is ever able to trace activity back to a particular user”); Tor: Overview, supra note
11.
79
Abbott, supra note 10, at 23. While relay and exit node operators are listed publicly, a third type
of operator (called a “bridge node”) remains hidden from public view and reserves its services for users
whose governments actively censor the Internet. Id.
80
Id. at 22.
81
See id. at 26. The fact that all Tor users take on the IP addresses of their exit node operators
exposes the latter to liability for the former’s wrongdoing. See discussion infra Part II.A.
82
DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 3 (“A centralized tool puts all of its users’ requests through one or
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of a centralized file-sharing tool was Napster, whose servers maintained an
index of MP3 song files available to download from its users.83
Tor is decentralized in the sense that the software itself routes all user
activity through a series of volunteer operators, and no single entity
monitors or controls the process.84 In essence, the software does everything
short of funding itself and updating its own code—functions currently
performed by TorProject.org. Running in “client mode,” Tor offers the user
anonymity and access to censored websites. In “server mode,” it adds the
computer to a worldwide network of Tor operators who facilitate
anonymous, unfiltered web access for Tor users.85 This decentralized design
allows the Tor service to endure in the absence of an overseeing entity.86
As with many Internet innovations, Tor technology is a double-edged
sword.87 The same anonymity technology that can save an Iranian
dissident’s life can make a direct infringer untraceable to the copyright
holder.88 And from Tor’s perspective, a government-blocked website looks
the same as Hulu.com’s IP filtration scheme that permits access only to
a few servers that the tool operator controls.”).
83
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming an
injunction “against Napster’s participation in copyright infringement” and determining that “Napster
may be vicariously liable when it fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude
access to potentially infringing files listed in its search index”).
84
DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 3 (“A decentralized design like Tor . . . sends the traffic through
multiple different locations, so there is no single location or entity that gets to watch what websites each
user is accessing.”).
85
Eric J. Stieglitz, Note, Anonymity on the Internet: How Does It Work, Who Needs It, and What
Are Its Policy Implications?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1395, 1402–03 (2007) (discussing Tor in
the context of tools that allow Internet users, including Chinese dissidents, to bypass censorship).
86
See Abbott, supra note 10, at 26 (“Tor is not Napster. There is no central authority to shut down
and no key technology to outlaw.”); see also DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 2 (comparing Tor to
Psiphon, Java Anon Proxy, Freegate, and Ultrareach—censorship-bypass tools that do not have
volunteer-operated networks). A similarly decentralized architecture has made Gnutella, another filesharing network, notoriously difficult to shut down. Less than one month after the court-ordered
injunction of the LimeWire service (a popular Gnutella client), LimeWire Pirate Edition emerged,
courtesy of an unknown development team. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Wire LLC, No. 06 Civ.
05936 (KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115675, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2010) (granting a permanent
injunction against Lime Wire LLC); Chloe Albanesius, Report: LimeWire ‘Resurrected’ by Secret Dev
Team, PCMAG.COM (Nov. 9, 2010, 5:50 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2372412,00.asp
(“LimeWire Pirate Edition should work better than the last functioning version of LimeWire (5.5.10),
and it should keep working for longer. There’s no adware or spyware: the piratical monkeys are doing
this for the benefit of the community.” (quoting an anonymous source) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
87
Speaking in the context of liberation technology, Professor Diamond observes that, “[i]n the end,
technology is merely a tool, open to both noble and nefarious purposes” but notes that innovative
citizens in places like Iran can use these tools to bring down authoritarianism. Diamond, supra note 4, at
71, 80.
88
Lawrence Lessig makes a similar (if more dramatic) point, noting that, “technologies that enable
Aung San Suu Kyi to continue to push for democracy in Burma will enable Al Qaeda to continue to
wage its terrorist war against the United States.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 225 (2006).
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U.S. web users89—both are roadblocks easily bypassed by routing traffic
through operators in other locations.
On one hand, some see Tor as a “beacon of democracy.”90 In June
2009, as U.S. media found themselves sifting through Twitter feeds for
news on the Iranian situation,91 the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) (a
U.S.-based nonprofit organization dedicated to defending civil rights in the
“digital world”) urged “[t]hose looking to help fight censorship” in Iran to
become Tor operators.92 Newly minted activists and technophiles around the
world shared EFF’s sentiment,93 and Tor usage within Iran increased 950%
during that month.94 Currently, over 42,000 Iranians use Tor on any given
day.95

89

See Help: International (Outside USA), HULU, http://www.hulu.com/support/article/171122 (last
visited July 2, 2012) (“Our intention is to make Hulu’s growing content lineup available worldwide as
quickly as possible. This requires working with the content owners to clear the rights for each show or
film in each specific region. . . . We don’t have a definite timeline, but we’ll continue to work to make it
happen.”). Hulu’s filtration scheme demonstrates one way in which websites utilize geolocation—the
derivation of geographic information from a user’s IP address. For a discussion of geolocation, see King,
supra note 17.
90
Abbott, supra note 10.
91
Golnaz Esfandiari, The Twitter Devolution, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 7, 2010),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt
(“Western
journalists who couldn’t reach—or didn’t bother reaching?—people on the ground in Iran simply
scrolled through the English-language tweets posted with tag #iranelection.”). Esfandiari argues that
media reports of Twitter usage within Iran were greatly exaggerated—a position that is not incompatible
with this Comment’s discussion of social networking as a vehicle for getting unbiased news reports out
of Iran.
92
Richard Esguerra, Help Protesters in Iran: Run a Tor Bridge or a Tor Relay, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 29, 2009), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/06/help-protesters-iran-run-torrelays-bridges. EFF continues to promote Tor as a way to aid Iranian activists. See The EFF Tor
Challenge, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/torchallenge (last visited July 2, 2012)
(“Activists worldwide use Tor to protect their anonymity online and to circumvent Internet censorship.
But they all rely on a limited number of user-provided ‘relays’ to protect themselves and communicate
with others. Internet users worldwide need your help to make the Tor network stronger and faster, so
take the Tor Challenge today!”); What Is a Tor Relay?, supra note 11 (describing Tor and quoting an
anonymous Iranian human rights activist as saying that “we use Tor to access our website and to publish
to our blog, which is blocked inside of our country”).
93
See, e.g., DanX, How to Setup a Tor Relay or Tor Bridge, WHY WE PROTEST (June 18, 2009),
https://whyweprotest.net/community/threads/how-to-setup-a-tor-relay-or-tor-bridge.69952 (describing
Tor as “something of great value to our friends in Iran”); Cory Doctorow, Run a TOR Node, Help
Iranians and Others Keep Their Privacy, BOINGBOING (June 29, 2009, 10:34 PM), http://www.
boingboing.net/2009/06/29/run-a-tor-node-help.html (“Whatever you think of Mousavi, I suspect that
we all agree that Iranian citizens should be allowed to communicate without being spied upon by their
governments (if only Americans enjoyed this right!).”).
94
See karsten, Measuring Tor and Iran (Part Two), TOR BLOG (July 1, 2009), http://blog.torproject.
org/blog/measuring-tor-and-iran-part-two.
95
See Tor Metrics Portal: Users, TOR PROJECT, https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html?graph=
direct-users&country=ir#direct-users (last visited July 2, 2012) (showing a mean of 42,062 daily users
connecting from Iran).
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Others view Tor differently—as a “den of thieves and pedophiles”96—
because it can frustrate law enforcement efforts that rely on IP tracking. Tor
is particularly frustrating in that it does not, at present, give law
enforcement “backdoor” access to encrypted data.97 And because of its
decentralized design and multilayered encryption, Tor operators are
incapable of identifying the sources of transmissions that travel through
their virtual tunnels.98 An Internet user could theoretically use Tor to remain
anonymous while engaging in all manner of illegal online activity—from
defamation to child pornography trafficking99 to material support of
terrorism.100 Even under court order, a Tor operator would have “no
incriminating information to turn over.”101
Although a complete discussion of Tor in the context of wiretap law is
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth noting that Tor operators,
and providers of similar anonymity technologies, may soon find themselves
the targets of new legislation requiring backdoor access to encrypted data.
FBI and NSA officials have urged Congress to propose legislation that
would require all communication-enabling services to be technically
capable of complying with wiretap orders.102 Encryption services would
likely be required to be capable of unscrambling their data and intercepting
peer-to-peer communications if asked to do so by a court.103 Such legislation
would undermine Tor’s many positive uses because, once a backdoor is
96

Abbott, supra note 10, at 22.
Tor Project: FAQ, supra note 72 (“There is absolutely no backdoor in Tor. Nobody has asked us
to put one in, and we know some smart lawyers who say that it’s unlikely that anybody will try to make
us add one in our jurisdiction (U.S.). If they do ask us, we will fight them, and (the lawyers say)
probably win.”).
98
This statement presumes that the Tor operator is using Tor software as intended. Like most
software, Tor can be hacked. See, e.g., infra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing hacks directed
at catching child pornography traffickers).
99
German police have intercepted child pornography trafficked over Tor. See Ryan Singel, German
Cops Raid Home of Wikileaks and Tor Volunteer—Update, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2009, 12:04 PM), http://
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/wikileaks-domai (reporting a raid on the home of Wikileaks
supporter and Tor operator, Theodor Reppe, as part of a child pornography investigation). In the United
States, concerns over Tor-encrypted child-pornography trafficking led security researcher and renowned
hacker HD Moore to develop a controversial program that can identify child pornographers on the Tor
network. See Robert Lemos, Tor Hack Proposed to Catch Criminals, SECURITYFOCUS (Mar. 8, 2007),
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11447. A representative of the Tor Project pointed out that Moore’s
program, called “Torment . . . could also be used by authoritarian regimes to track down democracy
activists or by the United States’ enemies to track down the military intelligence officers that use the
network.” Id.
100
The extent of illegal activity over any effective anonymity network is perhaps by its very nature
impossible to ascertain. That said, there is some evidence of child-pornography trafficking and file
sharing over the Tor network. See Singel, supra note 99.
101
Abbott, supra note 10.
102
Charlie Savage, U.S. Is Working to Ease Wiretaps on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2010, at
A1.
103
Id.
97
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opened for law enforcement, it is likely only a matter of time before hackers
and hostile governments find their way in.104
Whatever the outcome of this proposed legislation, those who view Tor
as a “den of thieves” may soon find support for their position in the context
of copyright infringement litigation. The next Part explores the likely shape
of this litigation: Volunteer Tor operators may find themselves wrongly
fingered as infringers, blamed for file-sharing activity that passed through
their virtual tunnels.
II. LOOKING AHEAD: TOR LITIGATION
The use of Tor to conceal copyright infringement is, as of this writing,
an unlitigated area. Nevertheless, Tor operators in the United States are
almost certain to soon find themselves defendants in copyright infringement
actions. This Part explores the likely path of Tor litigation as a logical
consequence of pending actions involving the popular file-sharing protocol
BitTorrent, as well as the theories of liability likely to be employed against
Tor operators.
A. Anonymity and Illegal File Sharing: Tor Meets BitTorrent
More than a decade ago, former Grateful Dead lyricist and famed
cyber-libertarian105 John Perry Barlow prophesied that “[t]he future will
win; there will be no property in cyberspace.”106 Today, those who see Tor
as a den of copyright thieves might consider it a point for Barlow. File
sharing continues to be a major source of copyright litigation,107 and
individuals are using Tor to hide file-sharing activities.108 This marriage of
104

Greek hackers exploited a similar legally mandated backdoor in 2005, prompting Columbia
University computer science professor Steven M. Bellovin to characterize the FBI–NSA proposal as “a
disaster waiting to happen.” Id. (quoting Bellovin) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Tor Project
points out an additional problem with backdoors: “[T]he policy mechanisms needed to ensure correct
handling of this responsibility are enormous and unsolved.” Abuse FAQ, TOR PROJECT,
http://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en (last visited July 2, 2012).
105
”Cyberlibertarianism” is an ideology that “emphasizes individual rights, especially online rights,
as the most important political good.” Alexandra Samuel, Hacktivism and the Future of Democratic
Discourse, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE 123, 131 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004).
106
John Perry Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas: Will Copyright Survive the Napster Bomb?
Nope, but Creativity Will, WIRED, OCT. 2000, at 240, 241.
107
As of January 2011, nearly 100,000 BitTorrent users in the United States had been sued for
copyright infringement since the start of 2010. Ernesto, 100,000 P2P Users Sued in US Mass Lawsuits,
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 30, 2011), http://www.torrentfreak.com/100000-p2p-users-sued-in-us-masslawsuits-110130. By August 2011, that number had doubled. Ernesto, 200,000 BitTorrent Users Sued in
the United States, TORRENTFREAK (Aug. 8, 2011), http://www.torrentfreak.com/200000-bittorrentusers-sued-in-the-united-states-110808.
108
A recent study analyzing BitTorrent usage over the Tor network concluded that “more than half
of the traffic carried over Tor is BitTorrent.” Abdelberi Chaabane et al., Digging into Anonymous
Traffic: A Deep Analysis of the Tor Anonymizing Network, NETWORK & SYS. SECURITY, Sept. 1–3,
2010, at 167, 170, available at http://planete.inrialpes.fr/papers/TorTraffic-NSS10.pdf. The Tor Project
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anonymity technology and file sharing is perhaps no more surprising than a
burglar’s decision to wear gloves instead of leaving fingerprints.109 And the
honeymoon is not likely to be over anytime soon, as increased federal
funding110 of Tor-like technology will encourage new anonymity and
censorship-bypass providers to enter the marketplace.111
District courts in Washington, D.C. are already seeing the likely
precursors of Tor litigation. In “the most sweeping antipiracy litigation
since 2003,” thousands of users of the popular file-sharing protocol
BitTorrent were accused of sharing unauthorized copies of independent
films including Academy Award-winner The Hurt Locker.112 U.S.
Copyright Group (USCG), the plaintiff in what has come to be known as
“Hurt Locker litigation,” filed a number of John Doe infringement suits
seeking subpoenas forcing the alleged infringers’ ISPs to reveal each user’s
identity using lists of IP addresses furnished by the plaintiffs.113 If any of the
true infringers had the presence of mind to mask their IP addresses using
Tor, the subpoenaed ISPs will reveal the identities of the Tor exit node
operators whose IP addresses appear, on the surface, to be those of the
direct infringers.114 Thus, Tor operators may soon find themselves in court
facing damages of up to $150,000 per illegally copied movie.115
This type of litigation puts ISPs in the unenviable position of
potentially having to produce and reveal customer information, but these
are hardly the only costs incurred by ISPs as a consequence of file sharing.
ISPs have a business interest in minimizing illegal file-sharing activity
acknowledges widespread file sharing via Tor—an activity that it considers to be abuse. See mikeperry,
Tips for Running an Exit Node with Minimal Harassment, TOR BLOG (June 30, 2010),
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exit-node-minimal-harassment (“Excessive bittorrent abuse
over Tor unfortunately means you will likely receive a deluge of DMCA abuse complaints.”). For a
discussion of DMCA abuse complaints directed at Tor operators, see infra notes 137–38 and
accompanying text.
109
Eric Stieglitz arguably predicted the Tor–BitTorrent union back in 2007 when he wrote,
“[M]usic traders could easily move away from open peer-to-peer software and to anonymous networks
where their true identity would remain masked from legal process.” Stieglitz, supra note 85, at 1413.
110
See, e.g., supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (discussing the VOICE Act).
111
The Tor Project’s Executive Director Andrew Lewman has said that the “growing amount of
money available for Web circumvention and activism” will encourage the already observable trend of
“companies retooling themselves to become circumvention providers.” Lake, supra note 64 (quoting
Lewman).
112
Greg Sandoval, Accused ‘Hurt Locker’ Pirates Turn to Law School, CNET NEWS (Nov. 1, 2010,
5:39 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-20021307-261.html.
113
See Voltage Pictures, LLC v. Does 1–5,000, 818 F. Supp. 2d 28, 31, 45 (D.D.C. 2011).
114
For further discussion of this hypothetical scenario see infra note 186 and accompanying text.
115
These are the damages alleged by USCG in the Hurt Locker litigation. See USCG v. The People,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/uscg (last visited July 2, 2012) (“Once the user’s identity is
known, USCG’s strategy appears to be to threaten a judgment of up to $150,000 per downloaded
movie—the maximum penalty allowable by law in copyright suits and a very unlikely judgment in cases
arising from a single noncommercial infringement—in order to pressure the alleged infringers to settle
quickly for $1,500 to $2,500 per person.”).
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since these transmissions—typically large music and video files—place
significant strains on bandwidth. One solution is bandwidth throttling, a
technique in which ISPs selectively block what they suspect to be filesharing traffic.116 ISPs can identify file-sharing traffic through a
controversial technique called “deep-packet inspection” (DPI).117 For
example, in 2007, the public learned that one ISP, Comcast, had been using
DPI to identify and selectively block BitTorrent traffic—a practice that
initially raised the ire of the FCC.118 The bad news for ISPs is that Tor
frustrates DPI119 and therefore hinders proactive attempts to thwart
copyright thievery.
Tor-facilitated infringement also poses special problems for plaintiffs.
Unable to trace the direct infringer whose IP remains buried beneath layers
of Tor encryption and without the prophylaxis of DPI-facilitated ISP
bandwidth throttling, it stands to reason that copyright holders will soon
turn to the only identifiable targets: the Tor operators whose IP addresses—
and hence identities—are, for the most part, publicly available. Exit node
operators face the greatest risk of liability because all Tor users take on the
IP address of their exit node operator.120 In other words, “[w]hen someone
does something improper via Tor, the exit node operator often gets
blamed.”121

116

See, e.g., David Kravets, Comcast Ordered to Allow Free Flow of File Sharing Traffic, WIRED
(Aug. 1, 2008, 9:03 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/fcc-declares-co. ISPs often rely on
this method of managing the flow of Internet data, also known as “traffic shaping.” See Peter Svensson,
Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 6:32 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.html; see also Kravets,
supra (reporting that Comcast’s practice of throttling was widespread).
117
See Kravets, supra note 116.
118
In re Formal Complaint of Free Press & Pub. Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly
Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028, 13029–31 (Aug. 1, 2008). The FCC ordered
Comcast to stop the practice, which it analogized to opening “customers’ mail because [Comcast] wants
to deliver mail not based on the address or type of stamp on the envelope but on the type of letter
contained therein.” Id. at 13051. Two years later, an appeals court vacated the FCC’s decision. See
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
119
As discussed supra note 74, Tor encrypts the Internet connection, and users are encouraged to
take the additional step of encrypting the actual contents of their transmissions. These double-encrypted
Tor transmissions appear least vulnerable to DPI. See Chaabane et al., supra note 108, at 169 (using DPI
to analyze Tor network usage and noting that more than 25% of traffic volume remained
unrecognizable, probably due to encryption); NEDANET, http://nedanet.org (last visited July 2, 2012)
(“The [Iranian] regime appears to be using deep packet inspection on all traffic in and out of Iran. Do
not use unencrypted communications for anything sensitive unless you want to be jailed, tortured, and
killed!”).
120
See Stjepan Groš et al., Protecting TOR Exit Nodes from Abuse, MIPRO, May 24–28, 2010, at
1246, 1246 (“[T]he Tor network is abused by the attackers but also people use it for all sorts of illegal
activities, of which child pornography is probably the most severe. This especially hurts the people who
run, so called, exit nodes because it seems like this malicious traffic is coming from them, and not from
those that originated the traffic.”).
121
Abbott, supra note 10, at 26.
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Even without the problem of untraceability, suing throngs of direct
infringers is a Herculean task.122 Thus, in the BitTorrent context, plaintiffs
have historically pursued the websites that make it possible for individuals
to find (and share) BitTorrent files.123 One could argue that Tor operators
are analogous to these BitTorrent clearinghouses in that they
too facilitate illegal file sharing.
B. Theories of Liability
A plaintiff alleging copyright infringement against a Tor operator
would likely proceed under a theory of contributory infringement because
the alternate theories of vicarious liability124 and inducement125 are less
likely to succeed. Vicarious liability is ill-suited because it would require
showing that the defendant had “an obvious and direct financial interest in
the exploitation of copyrighted materials.”126 Tor operators gain no financial
benefit from their actions. If anything, they incur costs in the form of
reduced bandwidth and computer processing resources.127
Inducement theory is also ill-suited as a theory of liability because it
would require the plaintiff to show that the Tor operator intended to induce
infringement by communicating messages “designed to stimulate others to

122

Indeed plaintiffs in the Hurt Locker litigation were forced to voluntarily dismiss tens of
thousands of unnamed defendants from the suit because ISPs were releasing user information so slowly
that plaintiffs could not meet the court’s filing deadlines. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
123
Courts have taken notice of this inherent difficulty when granting injunctive relief to copyright
holders in actions against BitTorrent indexing websites. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2010 Dist. LEXIS 91169, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2010) (“[G]iven
the multiplicity of infringements of Plaintiffs’ works caused by a single user downloading a single dottorrent file from Defendants’ sites . . . it would be untenable for Plaintiffs to track and proceed against
each infringing end-user.” (citation omitted)).
124
A defendant can be held vicariously liable for copyright infringement activity by a third party if
the defendant: (1) “possess[es] the right and ability to supervise the infringing conduct” and (2) “ha[s]
an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials.” 3 MELVILLE B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][2] (2011) (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
125
Under a theory of inducement, a defendant can be held liable for the direct infringement activity
of a third party if the defendant’s “active steps to encourage infringement lead[] to actual infringement
taking place.” Id. § 12.04[A][4][a] (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
127
See Tor FAQ, supra note 72 (“Tor relays do use a lot of ram. It is not unusual for a fast exit relay
to use 500–1000 MB of memory.”). Tor exit node operators probably incur the greatest time cost, as
successful operation of an exit node requires something on the order of an advanced computer science
degree and a fairly intricate understanding of copyright law. A brief glance at the elaborate response
templates developed by the Tor community to aid exit node operators in dealing with ISP complaints
should make this point abundantly clear. See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found., Response Template for Tor
Relay Operator to ISP, TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org/eff/tor-dmca-response.html (last
updated May 31, 2011) [hereinafter EFF, Response Template]; Tor Abuse Templates, TOR PROJECT,
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorAbuseTemplates (last visited July 2, 2012).
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commit violations.”128 Because this theory, a creature of the Supreme
Court’s 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.,129 has not been heavily tested, it remains unclear whether it could be
used effectively in the Tor context.130 Nevertheless, inducement theory is
not likely to succeed against a Tor operator because of one critical
distinction from the defendant file-sharing services in Grokster: While
Grokster, Ltd. somewhat blatantly advertised its illegal purpose,131 Tor
operators (and the Tor Project) typically hold themselves out as a privacy
and civil liberties tool and they actively discourage illegal file sharing over
the network.132 Although the Grokster service was structurally analogous to
Tor in that both networks are decentralized,133 the Grokster-borne
inducement theory seems ill-suited in the Tor context.
Instead, plaintiffs will probably proceed under the more promising
theory of contributory infringement. To prevail under this theory, a plaintiff
would need to prove that the Tor operator: (1) had knowledge of
infringement and (2) materially contributed to it.134 The file-sharing service
Napster was famously enjoined under this theory of liability.135
Applied to a Tor operator, the first element of contributory
infringement—knowledge of infringement—is easily satisfied if the
operator received notice of alleged infringement, e.g., in the form of a
complaint from the copyright holder136 or (as more commonly happens)
from the operator’s ISP. When an ISP receives a complaint from a
copyright holder alleging infringement by one of the ISP’s customers, the
ISP may forward the notice to the alleged infringer as part of a statutorily
128

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005).
Id.
130
Riley, supra note 9, at 607.
131
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–38.
132
See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. Notably, discouraging file sharing is different
from policing file sharing—a practice that itself carries risk of liability for the Tor operator. I discuss
this risk infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
133
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928.
134
See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)
(defining a contributory infringer as “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another” (footnote omitted)); see also
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting Gershwin as the
test for contributory liability).
135
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit also
held that Napster was likely to be found liable under a theory of vicarious liability because Napster
profited directly from infringement and had both the right and ability to police infringing activity as a
consequence of its centralized server system. Id. at 1022–24. Napster also tried (unsuccessfully) to
invoke the same statutory safe harbor that this Comment argues should protect Tor operators. See id. at
1025. For a discussion of why Tor operators can succeed where Napster failed, see infra Part III.C.
136
Napster was found to have actual knowledge of illegal file sharing partly because plaintiff
Recording Industry Association of America had placed it on notice of thousands of infringing files.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020 n.5.
129
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prescribed process commonly known as “notice and takedown.” By
implementing the notice and takedown regime established in § 512(c) of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the ISP lays a foundation for
its own immunity as a transitory digital communication provider under
§ 512(a).137
Tor exit node operators are particularly likely to receive these § 512(c)
notices, because theirs are the only IP addresses that a destination website
will ever see.138 Indeed, the risk associated with exit node operation may
explain why the majority of Tor node operators disallow exit connections
entirely.139 Exit node operators who find themselves the recipients of
§ 512(c) notices might choose to respond to the ISP and contest the
allegations.140 In the context of a contributory infringement action, such a
response might paradoxically increase the operator’s risk of liability by
proving the knowledge element.
Plaintiffs could potentially establish the second element of contributory
infringement, material contribution to the infringement, by arguing that Tor
helps individuals access and disseminate infringing material. By
anonymizing the direct infringer’s Internet activity, the Tor operator
arguably eliminates a fear of detection that may otherwise discourage such
activity.
EFF, a prominent nonprofit organization dedicated to defending civil
liberties “in the digital world,”141 argues that Tor operators who enable
others to use the Internet anonymously are performing lawful activities and
should not be liable for activity occurring in their tunnels.142 Since 2005,
EFF has actively sought test case volunteers in the hopes of setting “a clear
legal precedent establishing that merely running a relay does not create

137

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2006).
See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. Tor Project acknowledges this risk and warns
exit node operators of it. See Abuse FAQ, supra note 104 (“If you run a Tor relay that allows exit
connections . . . it’s probably safe to say that you will eventually hear from somebody. Abuse
complaints may come in a variety of forms.”).
139
See mikeperry, supra note 108 (“[E]xit nodes are typically on the scarce side. Exits usually
occupy 30–33% of network by capacity, but are currently at a whopping 38.5% . . . .”).
140
See, e.g., EFF, Response Template, supra note 127 (informing Tor operators that “anyone
providing routing services may face copyright complaints” but that the DMCA “safe harbors should
provide protections” to operators and their ISPs).
141
About EFF, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/about (last visited July 2, 2012). EFF
has been involved as plaintiff, defense counsel, or amicus curiae in a number of landmark disputes over
digital rights, including Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005), and
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See Legal Victories, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
http://www.eff.org/victories (last visited July 2, 2011).
142
EFF, Legal FAQ, supra note 72 (“[W]e believe that running a Tor relay—including an exit relay
that allows people to anonymously send and receive traffic—is lawful under U.S. law. . . . EFF believes
so strongly that those running Tor relays shouldn’t be liable for traffic that passes through the relay that
we’re running our own middle relay.”).
138
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copyright liability for either operators or their bandwidths providers.”143
EFF’s position will gain support if Tor operators are found to qualify for
immunity under § 512(a), the safe harbor provision for service providers
that merely act as conduits for digital communication144—an argument
presented in the next Part.
III. TOR OPERATORS AND THE DMCA § 512(A) SAFE HARBOR
Tor operators live in a fog of uncertainty surrounding secondary
infringement liability because their services have both infringing and
noninfringing uses. This specter of liability is, by itself, harmful because it
discourages new operators from joining the network, particularly as exit
nodes.145 And in a decentralized, volunteer-run network like Tor, a dearth of
operators is an existential threat to the overall service. For example, one
major problem for Tor users is network latency (i.e., slow download and
upload speeds)—a problem attributable to network size.146 While Tor’s user
base continues to grow, the growth of its operator network (currently
estimated at over 2800 active nodes147) has lagged behind, in part due to
legal uncertainty.148 There is a dearth of exit node operators149—an
143

Id.; see also Roger Dingledine, EFF Is Looking for Tor DMCA Test Case Volunteers, SEUL.ORG
(Oct. 26, 2005), http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Oct-2005/msg00208.html (describing the ideal test case
client).
144
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006).
145
See Tsuen-Wan “Johnny” Ngan et al., Building Incentives into Tor, in FINANCIAL
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 238, 241 (Radu Sion ed., 2010) (“[L]egal uncertainty may drive
users away from running [Tor] as an exit relay.”).
146
See DINGLEDINE, supra note 71, at 5 (“[As compared to centralized-trust designs,] distributedtrust designs . . . have a harder time tracking their users, and if they rely on volunteers to provide
capacity, then getting more volunteers is a more complex process than just paying for more
bandwidth.”); see also Cyrus Nemati, SXSW: Of Tech, Nerds, and New Media, CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Mar. 15, 2010), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/cyrus-nemati/sxsw-tech-nerds-andnew-media (“Tor is a fantastic anonymity network that is also fantastically slow, but the more people
who use it, the faster it gets. This enables Internet users in free countries to do a little bit to help create
an anonymous network for oppressed peoples.”).
147
See Tor Network Status—Network Detail, TORSTATUS, http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/network_
detail.php (last visited July 2, 2012) (showing a total of 2832 nodes in the “Aggregate Summary—
Number of Routers Matching Specified Criteria”). The Tor Project reports similar statistics. See Tor
Metrics Portal: Network, TOR PROJECT, https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html (last visited July 2,
2012). These are rough estimates because, of the three classes of nodes comprising the Tor operator
network, only two (relay nodes and exit nodes) are listed publicly. Abbott, supra note 10, at 23; see also
TorDNSExitList,
TOR
PROJECT,
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/TheOnionRouter/
TorDNSExitList (last visited July 2, 2012) (explaining how to determine if a particular IP address
belongs to a Tor exit node). Publicly listed nodes are susceptible to blocking by governments or
websites that seek to deter Tor usage. For this reason, the IP addresses of Tor “bridge” providers (the
third type of node) are never made public. Abbott, supra note 10, at 22–23.
148
Ngan et al., supra note 145.
149
See Tor FAQ, supra note 72 (“If you have lots of bandwidth, you should definitely run a normal
relay . . . . If you’re willing to be an exit, you should definitely run a normal relay, since we need more
exits.”).
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unsurprising fact, given that they face the greatest risk of liability.
This specter of liability also chills speech. Fearing liability, ISPs and
institutional service providers (including universities) increasingly censor
their users—including Tor operators.150 And operators who receive DMCA
§ 512(c) notices from their ISPs may, quite understandably, choose to cease
the activity rather than risk losing Internet connectivity.151
This Part argues that Tor operators, like ISPs, should be entitled to
statutory safe harbor under DMCA § 512(a) as conduits for transitory
network communications.152 Section 512 of the DMCA, also called the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA), creates
four separate safe harbor provisions.153 Parties falling within a safe harbor
provision are exempt from monetary liability, but they may still face
injunctive orders.154
A. Tor Operators Are Eligible for § 512 Safe Harbor Protection
Section 512(a) limits monetary liability for digital network
communication service providers that merely act as conduits for
information.155 “Service provider” is a term of art, defined within the statute
to indicate “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among points
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification
to the content of the material as sent or received.”156 Tor fits this definition
rather neatly—it passes a user’s Internet traffic through a circuit of Tor
150

Researchers at the University of Colorado, Boulder, experienced this effect firsthand. To better
understand Tor’s uses and misuses, they launched an exit node and collected usage data in the form of
traffic logs. The researchers received numerous § 512(c) notices and were asked by university
administration to discontinue the node. See McCoy et al., supra note 8, at 63–66, 71.
151
The Tor Project recommends that exit node operators communicate proactively with their ISPs
so that they “don’t end up being shut down due to easily preventable abuse complaints.” mikeperry,
supra note 108. However, as one exit node operator’s comment illustrates, this is easier said than done:
“I just had to shut down my exit node due to DMCA complaints for bittorrent traffic. My exit node
received 7 DMCA complaints within two months. . . . The provider was very understanding, but were
[sic] getting pressure from their upstream provider.” Anonymous, Tips for Running an Exit Node with
Minimal Harassment, TOR BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010), https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tips-running-exitnode-minimal-harassment.
152
17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006).
153
See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Pub. L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified at § 512). See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 124, § 12B.01[C][1–2] (providing an
overview of DMCA limitations on liability); id. § 12B.02 (discussing the first safe harbor provision, for
transitory digital network communications).
154
See id. § 12B.01[C][2] (“The distinctive feature of [OCILLA] is that it creates something that
falls slightly short of being a complete exemption. Instead, it creates various ‘limitations on liability,’
which are tantamount to exemptions in all material respects but one: a party who qualifies may still be
subject to injunction.” (footnotes omitted)).
155
§ 512(a).
156
Id. § 512(k)(1)(A).
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operators before routing it to the destination. As the Tor Project website
explains, “Tor does not modify, or even know, what you are sending into it.
It merely relays your traffic.”157
To qualify for any of the four safe harbors in § 512, service providers
must meet two threshold conditions for eligibility. They must (1) maintain a
termination policy for repeat infringers158 and (2) comply with “standard
technical measures.”159
First, under § 512(i)(1)(A), service providers must adopt, reasonably
implement, and inform their subscribers or account holders of their
termination policies addressing repeat infringers.160 Tor arguably meets this
condition through the use of “exit policies” that govern the specific types of
connections (known as “ports”) that are permitted or denied by each
operator.161 For example, Tor’s default exit policy attempts to prevent
spamming and file sharing by blocking the ports typically associated with
those activities.162
Admittedly, exit policies do not constitute strict adherence to
§ 512(i)(1)(A). Tor is not a subscription service, and its users—be they
repeat infringers or law-abiding citizens—are quite intentionally
unidentifiable. However, in the context of an anonymity network, an
operator who adopts a reasonable exit policy designed to prevent filesharing traffic is complying with this provision to the fullest extent possible
and should be deemed eligible for safe harbor protection.
The second condition for safe harbor eligibility, § 512(i)(1)(B),
requires service providers to “accommodate[] and . . . not interfere with
standard technical measures.”163 Although the term “standard technical
measures” is subsequently defined as “technical measures that are used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works,”164 it remains an

157

Tor FAQ, supra note 72. This statement assumes that the Tor operator is using the software as
intended. It is technically possible for operators to modify Tor’s software in such a way as to allow
inspection of outgoing data. Tor operators are cautioned not to do this. See EFF, Legal FAQ, supra note
72 (“Do not examine the contents of anyone’s communications without first talking to a lawyer.”). Tor
users can protect themselves against malicious exit nodes by using encryption—“https” instead of
“http.” See Surveillance Self-Defense, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://ssd.eff.org/tech/tor (last visited
July 2, 2012).
158
§ 512(i)(1)(A).
159
Id. § 512(i)(1)(B).
160
Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
161
See Tor FAQ, supra note 72 (explaining that exit policies were implemented to minimize abuse).
162
Id.; see also Abbott, supra note 10, at 26 (“Nearly every exit node disallows email traffic to
prevent spam and blocks file-sharing traffic to prevent DMCA issues. . . . This ability to block
access . . . gives exit node operators protection and thereby increases the number of willing operators.”).
But see McCoy et al., supra note 150, at 67 (observing that port-based blocking strategies are easily
circumvented).
163
§ 512(i)(1)(B).
164
Id. § 512(i)(2).
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elusive concept in practice.165
Countersurveillance specialist Richard Abbott suggests that Tor
operators may run afoul of the § 512(i)(1)(B) noninterference requirement
because they enable Tor users to reach websites in spite of IP filtering—a
method that allows websites to display content only to users within a given
geographic location, while blocking the rest.166 IP filtering, also called “geoblocking,” allows websites to deliver copyrighted content in compliance
with licensing agreements that restrict distribution rights to specific
locations.167 Tor defeats IP filtering because it can, for example, enable
U.S.-based users to access BBC broadcast materials intended for U.K.
audiences by routing traffic through an exit node whose IP address is
located in the United Kingdom.168 However, an interpretation of “standard
technical measures” that encompasses IP filtering would be unworkably
broad. As Abbott points out, it would sweep in other widely used (and
legal) technologies, including virtual private networks (VPNs).169
165

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 124, at § 12B.02[B][3][a] (“Even as of many years after
enactment of [OCILLA], it is unclear whether there is any such thing as ‘standard technical
measures.’”).
166
Abbott, supra note 10, at 25–26.
167
See Michael Geist, Geo-Blocking Sites a Business Rather Than Legal Issue, MICHAEL GEIST
(July 8, 2010), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/5179/135 (“[T]he geo-blocking approach is . . .
an attempt to preserve an older business model, namely content licencing on a country-by-country or
market-by-market approach . . . .”). Dr. Geist observed that geo-blocking is a worldwide phenomenon,
affecting U.S. users (who, at that time, could not reach the U.K.-based music service Spotify) and
Canadian users (who cannot reach the popular U.S.-based music service Pandora). Id. Spotify launched
a service for the United States in July 2011. See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Spotify (Finally) Launches in the
U.S., CNET NEWS (July 14, 2011, 5:10 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13506_3-20079400-17/spotifyfinally-launches-in-the-u.s.
168
I borrow this example from Abbott, supra note 10, at 25 (“Tor allows anyone to access the
BBC’s Web site via a UK exit node via a UK IP address.”).
Tor’s IP filter-busting capabilities could, incidentally, also spell liability for Tor operators and
distributors of Tor technology, even in the absence of actual infringement. Although this frightening
prospect is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief explanation is warranted. The operator’s liability
might arise under DMCA § 1201(a)(1)(A), a provision that outlaws circumvention of copyright access
protection measures. IP address filtering is arguably a “technological measure that effectively controls
access” to a protected work and is circumvented by the Tor operator who masks the actual user’s IP
address—conduct prohibited under § 1201(a)(1)(A). See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.
105-304, § 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998) (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006)). A related provision,
§ 1201(a)(2), creates liability for manufacturers and traffickers of technology that circumvents such
access-protection measures. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes teaches that “the anti-trafficking
provision of the DMCA is implicated where one presents, holds out or makes a circumvention
technology or device available, knowing its nature, for the purpose of allowing others to acquire it.”
111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429 (2d Cir. 2001). Any distributor of Tor software is arguably vulnerable to liability under this line of
reasoning. At present, that distributor is U.S.-based nonprofit organization The Tor Project.
169
Abbott, supra note 10, at 25. Using VPN technology, an employer can give its remote
employees secure, encrypted access to data residing on the employer’s private network. See, e.g., Cisco
VPN Client, CISCO, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps2308/index.html (last visited
July 2, 2012). VPN technology is spreading beyond the corporate world as a way for users of unsecured
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Tor operators are, therefore, “service providers” who meet § 512’s two
general requirements. This threshold eligibility opens up four statutory safe
harbors, of which only § 512(a) (the safe harbor for “Transitory Digital
Network Communications,” also called the conduit safe harbor) is likely to
be invoked by a Tor operator.170 It is to the operator’s eligibility under this
subsection that I now turn.
B. Tor Operators Should Enjoy § 512(a) Conduit Safe Harbor
Under DMCA § 512(a), a service provider is not liable for
infringement of copyright [that occurs] by reason of the provider’s
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system
or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason
of the intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such
transmitting, routing, or providing connections

provided that five statutory requirements are met.171 Tor meets the five
requirements as follows.
First, under § 512(a)(1), the transmission must be “initiated by or at the
direction of a person other than the service provider.”172 This is true of Tor
operators in that they merely relay Internet traffic initiated by a Tor user.173
Second, under § 512(a)(2), “the transmission, routing, provision of
connections, or storage” must be “carried out through an automatic
technical process without selection of the material by the service
provider.”174 That is precisely what Tor software does: it automatically
selects a random circuit of Tor operators through which it routes the Tor
user’s activity.175 Operators do not select the routed material—the software
does it for them.
One could argue that the operator’s ability to set an exit policy176
public Wi-Fi connections to protect themselves from a form of identity theft know as “session
hijacking.” See, e.g., Jolie O’Dell, HOW TO: Protect Yourself from Firesheep with a VPN, MASHABLE
TECH (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.mashable.com/2010/10/28/firesheep-vpns (discussing VPN as a way
to protect private information from hackers using the malicious session hijacking program Firesheep).
170
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) also provides limited liability, under specified circumstances, to service
providers that (1) store data only temporarily (the “System Caching” safe harbor under § 512(b)), (2)
store user-generated data (the safe harbor for “Information Residing on Systems or Networks at
Direction of Users” under § 512(c)), or (3) act as search engines (the safe harbor for “Information
Location Tools” under § 512(d)). Tor operators perform none of these functions.
171
Id. § 512(a).
172
Id. § 512(a)(1).
173
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
174
§ 512(a)(2).
175
See Tor: Overview, supra note 11 (“Instead of taking a direct route from source to destination,
data packets on the Tor network take a random pathway through several relays . . . . To create a private
network pathway with Tor, the user’s software or client incrementally builds a circuit of encrypted
connections through relays on the network.”).
176
For a discussion of Tor operator exit policies, see supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
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constitutes a selection of routed material, thereby disqualifying Tor
operators from the conduit safe harbor for failure to meet § 512(a)(2). This
is partly true. By turning off a specific port, an operator can ensure that the
type of material typically transmitted through the blocked port will not be
routed through that operator’s tunnel. However, rather than selecting (or
more accurately, blocking) specific material, the exit node operator is
making a wholesale decision to block all material—infringing or
otherwise—that may be transmitted over a given port. This level of control
is therefore much too attenuated to constitute a “selection” of material for
§ 512(a)(2) purposes.
Under the third statutory requirement, service providers must “not
select the recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the
request of another person.”177 This is true as to the ultimate recipient of
material transmitted through a circuit of Tor operators because the
destination is predetermined by the Tor user who initiated the request.
Operators who route traffic along the circuit are not properly characterized
as “recipients”;178 hence, it is irrelevant that the precise pathway (that is, the
sequence of operators randomly selected by Tor software to form the
circuit) is not actually selected by the user.
Tor operators also meet the fourth statutory requirement:
[N]o copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network in a
manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipients, and
no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner ordinarily
accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is reasonably
necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections.179

Operators do not store the transmitted data—they merely hand it off
from one node to another until reaching the exit node, which then passes the
data to the user’s destination.180 Although it is technically possible for a
malicious exit node operator to capture and store information at this final
handoff,181 doing so would require modifying the Tor software itself.182 Such
an individual is not so much a Tor operator as a garden-variety hacker.
177

§ 512(a)(3).
See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179
§ 512(a)(4).
180
The same process occurs in reverse when the destination responds to a Tor user’s request: data
travels back through a random circuit of Tor operators before arriving at the user. See Tor: Overview,
supra note 11.
181
See McCoy et al., supra note 8, at 67–68 (explaining that an eavesdropping exit node can, in
some situations, capture identifying information such as usernames and passwords).
182
See EFF, Legal FAQ, supra note 72 (“You may be technically capable of modifying the Tor
source code or installing additional software to monitor or log plaintext that exits your relay. However,
Tor relay operators in the United States can possibly create civil and even criminal liability for
themselves under state or federal wiretap laws if they monitor, log, or disclose Tor users’
communications . . . .”).
178
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Tor operators meet the final requirement, transmission of material
“through the system or network without modification of its content,”183 as a
consequence of the same automatic process discussed in connection with
§ 512(a)(3). Operators do not inspect content much less modify it. They
merely route information along a randomly assigned circuit.
C. Conduit Safe Harbor in the File-Sharing Context: Why Tor Operators
Can Prevail Where Napster Failed184
I anticipate that Tor litigation will arise in an illegal file-sharing
context, most likely in connection with the popular BitTorrent file-sharing
protocol. For example, the Hurt Locker litigation185 might lead to the
identification of defendants’ IP addresses belonging to Tor exit node
operators.186 In the absence of direct evidence, plaintiffs would likely be
unable to prove direct infringement by a Tor operator because the
operator’s passivity weighs heavily against finding the volitional element
required for direct infringement.187 There is, however, a case to be made for
contributory infringement liability.188
Defendant file-sharing services have not fared well in secondary
infringement actions,189 and it stands to reason that Tor operator–defendants
183

§ 512(a)(5).
This Part uses Napster, rather than Grokster, as a comparator for reasons discussed supra text
accompanying notes 130–33.
185
See supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text.
186
Rights holders who seek to identify direct infringers through the statutory subpoena process
described in DMCA § 512(h) do, admittedly, face an uphill battle. This is because § 512(h) has been
interpreted not to apply to online service providers that act merely as conduits for allegedly infringing
information. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he text of § 512(h) and the overall structure of § 512 clearly
establish . . . that § 512(h) does not authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere
conduit for the transmission of information sent by others.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 924 (2004); see also
In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc. Subpoena Enforcement Matter, 393 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2005)
(agreeing with Verizon’s reasoning).
187
See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1369–70
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a
third party.”).
188
An interesting question arises as to whether plaintiffs would seek to subpoena the Tor operator
in an attempt to reveal the direct infringer’s identity. By its nature, Tor ensures that operators will have
“no incriminating information to turn over.” Abbott, supra note 10 (noting further that operators cannot
“effectively police the activity of users”). Although the last link in the chain—the exit node—can
potentially eavesdrop on the information that passes between it and the destination, it has no way of
identifying the original user who initiated the communication. Id. at 23–24; see also supra note 157
(discussing exit node abuse).
189
See, e.g., A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL 573136, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. May 12, 2000) (denying defendant Napster’s motion for summary judgment and finding that
184
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would face many of the same arguments against safe harbor that helped
plaintiffs defeat the likes of Napster. But Tor is not a file-sharing service,
and decentralized, volunteer-run anonymity networks like Tor can satisfy
conduit safe harbor requirements where file-sharing services have failed.
Admittedly, the Tor network does resemble a file-sharing network,190
and the emergence of Tor–BitTorrent hybrid programs such as Vuze191 blurs
the distinction even further. File-sharing pioneer Napster tried the § 512(a)
defense and failed so miserably that its de facto successor, Grokster, did not
even bother invoking a conduit safe harbor defense when it stood accused
of contributory infringement.192 Napster’s play for conduit safe harbor failed
because it did not “transmit, route, or provide connections for allegedly
infringing material through its system.”193 Noting the intentions of
Congress to limit § 512(a) to situations “in which a service provider plays
the role of a ‘conduit’ for the communications of others,”194 the district
court found that Napster’s role in conveying “address information to
establish a connection between the requesting and host[ing] users” did not
constitute a connection provided “through” its system.195 Rather than
traveling through the Napster system, the connection was found to occur
“through the Internet.”196
Tor is easily distinguishable from Napster. Whereas Napster’s
infringing transmissions never traveled through Napster servers—passing
instead from host to recipient “through the Internet”197—an infringing
transmission would travel directly through a Tor operator’s computer. The
fact that traffic emerges at the destination bearing the exit node’s IP address
is proof that it has traveled “through” that operator. Thus, Tor operator–
defendants should qualify for safe harbor under § 512(a).
Unfortunately, even if Tor operator–defendants qualify for safe harbor
protection from monetary remedies under § 512(a) for the reasons described

Napster “does not meet the requirements of subsection 512(a)”).
190
See Paul Ohm, Good Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 44.
191
The popular BitTorrent client Vuze (formerly called Azureus) has built-in Tor support. Vuze
does, however, discourage using Tor to anonymize file-sharing traffic. See Anonymous File Sharing
Using Azureus with Tor and I2P, VUZEWIKI, http://wiki.vuze.com/w/Anonymous_file_sharing_using_
Azureus_with_Tor_and_I2P (last updated Mar. 3, 2010, 7:35 PM) (“Please DO NOT use Tor for routing
peer-to-peer data traffic, it can not handle the bandwidth. They have indicated that they will make efforts
to ban such usage if it continues, which will likely affect both legitimate and unwanted use!” (emphasis
omitted)). These statements, however self-serving when delivered by Vuze, are echoed by Tor. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 72.
192
See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text (discussing litigation against Grokster).
193
A & M Records, 2000 WL 573136, at *10 (emphasis added).
194
Id. at *8 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2 (1998)).
195
Id.
196
Id. Although neither party had attempted to define “routing” for the purposes of § 512(a), the
court found that routing also did not occur through Napster’s system. Id.
197
Id. at *7–8.
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in this Part, they may yet face injunctive action under § 512(j)(1)(B). Courts
considering such injunctive relief must weigh a number of statutorily
delineated factors including the burden placed upon a service provider, the
magnitude of likely harm to the rights holder, technical feasibility and
effectiveness of injunctive relief, and the availability of less burdensome
solutions.198 Part IV argues that injunctive action against a Tor operator
impinges on the operator’s First Amendment speech interest—a serious
burden that militates against the granting of injunctive relief.
IV. BALANCING HARMS: TOR AND FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS
“[I]n cyberspace, the First Amendment is a local ordinance.”
–John Perry Barlow199
The Tor operator is an individual who enables others to bypass
censorship and speak anonymously, and any limitation on the operator’s
ability to perform these functions raises First Amendment issues. By
allowing speakers—Tor users—to convey information anonymously and
without fear of reprisal, Tor operators are furthering a First Amendment
right to receive information.200 Further, the act of facilitating someone else’s
speech arguably constitutes “speech” for First Amendment purposes, and is
worthy of protection in and of itself.201 Courts in equity should weigh the
burden upon these twin interests when considering injunctive relief against
a Tor operator.202
A. Tor and the Right to Receive Information
The First Amendment undoubtedly protects an individual’s right to
receive information.203 This right operates in tandem with the press freedom

198

17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(2)(A)–(D) (2006).
LESSIG, supra note 88, at 383 n.4 (quoting John Perry Barlow).
200
See infra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
201
For example, in the context of campaign finance, restrictions on speech-facilitating monetary
contributions implicate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per
curiam) (“A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”).
202
As discussed supra Part III, § 512(a) shields transitory digital network providers from monetary
liability only—it leaves open the possibility of injunctive or equitable relief. In the file-sharing context,
plaintiffs have often sought injunctive relief to stop alleged infringement. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC
v. Lime Wire LLC, No. 06 Civ. 05936 (KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115675, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
26, 2010) (permanently enjoining the LimeWire file-sharing service).
203
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas. ‘This freedom [of speech and press] . . . necessarily
protects the right to receive . . . .’” (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943))).
199
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as a necessary consequence of the right to distribute information.204
Today’s press, the primary distributor of information, is a muchdemocratized version of its former self thanks to the phenomenon of citizen
journalism.205 Beyond our borders, oppressive regimes can no longer rely on
state-run media to deliver a preapproved monologue, as citizen journalists
have turned media into dialogue.206 We Americans, in turn, are no longer
required to judge the adequacy of our elected representatives’ foreign policy
decisions based solely on reports obtained through mainstream media.
Admittedly, the democratization of journalism has its flaws: amateur
journalists can be unreliable sources of information207 and professional
journalists might feel the need to abandon or abridge their journalistic
standards to compete with the amateurs in terms of sheer speed of news
dissemination.208 Nevertheless, as a phenomenon that can lend individuals
access to otherwise-unobtainable news, citizen journalism is a good thing.
That an informed citizenry is essential to the proper functioning of our own
democracy is “at once a cornerstone of serious legal and moral philosophy,
a high school civics verity, and a cliché.”209
Like the Iranian example of 2009, subsequent democratic movements
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and much of the Arab world—a phenomenon
termed the “Arab Spring”210—illustrate that people’s ability to receive
204

See Martin, 319 U.S. at 143 (“The right of freedom of speech and press has broad scope. The
authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and unconventional ideas might disturb the
complacent, but they chose to encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This freedom embraces the right to
distribute literature . . . and necessarily protects the right to receive it.” (footnote omitted)).
205
See A. Michael Froomkin, Technologies for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE, supra note
105, at 3, 9 (“Blogs represent one of the latest examples of the Internet’s democratization of
publishing.”).
206
See, e.g., Kendra Heideman & Haleh Esfandiari, You Are the Media: How Iranians
“Democratized” the Media, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, http://www.wilsoncenter.
org/event/you-are-the-media-how-iranians-democratized-the-media (last visited July 2, 2012) (“[T]he
rise of citizen journalism in Iran after the 2009 election symbolized a reversal of information
dissemination,
an
effective
‘democratization’
of
media. . . . [J]ournalist
Roozbeh
Mirebrahimi . . . commented that this transformation crushed the traditional ‘monologue’ and instead
created a new ‘dialogue’ in Iran.”).
207
See ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: HOW TODAY’S INTERNET IS KILLING OUR
CULTURE 5 (2007) (“It’s the blind leading the blind—infinite monkeys providing infinite information for
infinite readers, perpetuating the cycle of misinformation and ignorance.”).
208
See Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of Amateur
Journalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185, 209 (2006) (“When ‘pajama bloggers’ who need not answer
to an editor can rush stories onto millions of computer screens, professionals might abandon their
standards in order to compete.”).
209
Froomkin, supra note 205, at 3.
210
See Con Coughlin, From Arab Spring to Boiling-Hot Summer: Iran Is Ruthlessly Exploiting the
Pro-Democracy Movement for Its Own Ends, TELEGRAPH (May 10, 2011, 8:05 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/concoughlin/8505793/From-Arab-Spring-to-boilinghot-summer.html (explaining that the term “Arab Spring” was “meant to encapsulate the youthful
exuberance of the pro-democracy movements that had sprung up throughout the Middle East” in early
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accurate, timely information about world events is well-served by the
courageous work of citizen journalists abroad.211 Tor technology promotes
the exercise of the right to receive information.212 This technology offers a
nontraceability213 that is essential to protect speakers who live under
political repression—so essential that Lawrence Lessig has advocated for
recognition of a protected legal right to “privacy-enhancing
technologies.”214 Protecting online privacy is a laudable goal unto itself,215
and a speaker’s right to the same anonymity enjoyed by Publius of the
Federalist Papers is hardly in dispute.216 However, the Tor operator’s role
takes on constitutional dimensions when we recognize that protecting
speaker anonymity promotes a First Amendment right to receive
information.
B. Speech-Facilitation as Protected Speech
People volunteer to become Tor operators because they believe in
protecting civil liberties on the Internet. They donate things of measurable
pecuniary value: bandwidth, computer resources, and time. They do these
things to send a political statement about freedom in a digital age. Their
conduct, like the burning of a flag or a draft card, speaks volumes and
should be protected as speech.
During the same year that saw the invention of the World Wide Web,217
2011).

211

Even old-guard media establishments like the New York Times have incorporated citizen
journalism into their reporting on the Middle Eastern protest movements. See, e.g., Arab World
Uprisings: A Country-by-Country Look, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/world/middleeast/middle-east-hub.html?ref=middleeast (combining uncensored and
often untranslated Twitter postings with Times correspondent reports on Libya, Yemen, Syria, and
Egypt).
212
Writing on the issue of U.S. trade sanctions against Iran, Nadia Luhr argues that the sanctions
regime prior to March 2010 operated as a prior restraint on speech because it caused Americans to be
deprived of Iran-related news. Nadia L. Luhr, Note, Iran, Social Media, and U.S. Trade Sanctions: The
First Amendment Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 500, 520 (2010); id. at
501 (“Prohibiting American Web 2.0 companies from providing access to users in sanctioned countries
restricted Americans’ ability to receive communications from these users, and such a prohibition
constituted unconstitutional prior restraint.”).
213
Internet anonymity—or, more specifically, nontraceability—is the ability “to send a message
without the content of that message being traced to the sender.” LESSIG, supra note 88, at 224–25.
214
Id. Lessig defines “privacy-enhancing technologies” as those “technologies designed to give the
user more technical control over data associated with him or her.” Id. at 223.
215
It is also a goal shared by the Obama administration. See Julia Angwin, Watchdog Planned for
Online Privacy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2010, at A1 (“The Obama Administration is preparing a steppedup approach to policing Internet privacy that calls for new laws and the creation of a new position to
oversee the effort . . . .”).
216
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”).
217
The year was 1989, and the inventor’s name was Tim Berners-Lee (not Al Gore). See Tim
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the U.S. Supreme Court famously determined that defendant Gregory Lee
Johnson’s conduct—burning the American flag—was a form of political
expression protected by the First Amendment.218 Johnson teaches that
“conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First
Amendment into play” when it evinces an “intent to convey a particularized
message” and when that message is likely to be understood by its
audience.219
By the Johnson definition, a Tor operator’s conduct contains enough
elements of speech to implicate the First Amendment. Tor’s purpose is
articulated ad nauseam on numerous web pages hosted by the Tor Project,
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), and even the U.S. Naval
Research Laboratory.220 Tor exit node operators are also advised to post web
pages called “exit notices” so that curious ISPs can easily understand their
raisons d’être.221 The message is intentional, particularized, and conveyed
in the customary manner of the Internet—a web page.
Critics will be quick to point out that a weighing of First Amendment
interests is unnecessary because “copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations.”222 However, as the Supreme Court observed
in Eldred v. Ashcroft, copyright laws are not “categorically immune” from
First Amendment challenges.223 It stands to reason that relief granted in
vindication of a copyright violation is similarly not immune from
countervailing First Amendment considerations. A court considering
injunctive relief against a Tor operator is free to, and in fact must, balance
interests and harms in furtherance of equity.
We should apply laws to cyberspace in speech-protective ways because
in doing so we allow a democratizing medium to flourish elsewhere in the
Berners-Lee, WORLD WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/Overview.html
(last visited July 2, 2012).
218
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
219
Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)).
220
See, e.g., Esguerra, supra note 92 (EFF); Executive Summary, ONION ROUTING, http://www.
onion-router.net/Summary.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (U.S. Naval Research Laboratory).
221
See mikeperry, supra note 108 (“Once you have a good reverse DNS name, you should put some
content there that explains what Tor is for those who see the name and try to visit it via http.”). For a
sample Exit Notice, see This Is a Tor Exit Router, TOR PROJECT, http://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git?a=
blob_plain;hb=HEAD;f=contrib/tor-exit-notice.html (last visited July 2, 2012) (“This router is part of
the Tor Anonymity Network, which is dedicated to providing privacy to people who need it most:
average computer users.”).
222
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193, 219–21 (2003) (holding that the Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d), 112 Stat. 2827–28 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006)), which increases the duration of copyright protection of new and existing
works from fifty years to seventy years following the author’s death, did not violate the First
Amendment).
223
Id. at 221 (“We recognize that the D.C. Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights
‘categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment.’” (quoting Elrod v. Reno, 239 F.3d
372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
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world.224 As Jack Balkin has observed, the Internet is home to discussions,
debates, and collective activities whose value transcends national borders.225
And where people desire democracy but have little familiarity with its
customs, the Internet becomes a pedagogical tool conveying democratic
culture—“a culture in which ordinary people can participate, both
collectively and individually, in the creation and elaboration of cultural
meanings that constitute them as individuals.”226
Balkin argues that we should protect this digital democratic culture
because of its innate value to mankind, and regardless of its impact on
American politics or foreign policy.227 But one need not go quite that far to
protect a Tor operator’s speech—that speech immediately invokes a
political discussion of American civil liberties on the Internet and carries
implications for U.S. foreign policy. The proof is in the blogosphere.
Despite the best efforts of an unpopular and often lawless Iranian
government, democratic culture is emerging in the digital Iran. The Iranian
blogosphere, an online community inhabited by over 60,000 routinely
updated weblogs, is “full of advocates, on all sides. . . . featur[ing]
thousands of politically attentive individuals, commenting on every
imaginable issue, with a breadth of perspectives.”228 Iranian citizen
journalism is arguably on its way to replacing state-run media as a primary
source of news.229
By enabling an Iranian blogger to speak without fear of imprisonment
and providing an Iranian reader with the opportunity to become an educated
global citizen unconstrained by censorship, we promote free expression,
tolerance, and a sense of shared responsibility—cultural elements that are as
224

This is rooted in the ideas of Jack Balkin, who writes, “The Internet teaches us that the free
speech principle is about, and has always been about, the promotion and development of a democratic
culture.” Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2004).
225
Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 438
(2009) (“[W]hat people do on the Internet transcends the nation state; they participate in discussions,
debate, and collective activity that does not respect national borders.”).
226
Id. (citing Balkin, supra note 224, at 3–6, 33–50).
227
Id. at 438–39 (“These are valuable human activities in their own right; they should not be
protected only because and to the degree that they might contribute to debate about American politics, or
even American foreign policy.” (citing Balkin, supra note 224, at 32)).
228
John Kelly & Bruce Etling, Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian
Blogosphere 10–11 (Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Berkman Ctr. Research Publ’n No. 2008-01,
2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_
Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf. I am unable to determine the extent to which these bloggers
make use of anonymity technology.
229
See Doug Bernard, Blogs as Journalism in Iran, VOICE OF AM. (Apr. 12, 2010, 8:00 PM),
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/science-technology/Blogs-as-Journalism-in-Iran-90741249.html
(noting that, in Iran, “news stories often first appear on blogs, where writers are freer to cover events
outside the sanction of government censors”). Indeed, Iranian political cartoonist Nikahang Kowsar says
that what the U.S. considers citizen journalism is “just journalism” in Iran. Id.
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vital to a democracy as the right to vote.230 Balkin argues that democracy in
its broadest sense goes beyond an individual’s relationship to the state and
extends instead to culture as a whole.231 If we are truly committed to
nurturing democracy in places like Iran, we must recognize the role played
by online speakers in allowing individuals to mold a new culture from clay
of the old.
CONCLUSION
Tor operators, by their very existence, trigger a political dialogue about
the importance of online civil liberties, and their services facilitate the
development of democratic culture in places like Iran. They demonstrate
that Tor has undeniable noninfringing uses that merit protection, and its
volunteer operators should thus enjoy full First Amendment protection. At a
minimum, they should benefit from § 512(a) safe harbor as conduits of
digital communication.
Without a doubt, anonymity comes at a price and anonymity
technology may frustrate the efforts of creative artists who struggle to
enforce their copyrights. But set on a scale, our interests in cherishing the
right to receive information, protecting politically expressive conduct
online, and nurturing nascent democratic cultures by allowing the Internet
to flow freely in places like Iran outweighs the risk that Tor-like anonymity
networks will facilitate infringement.

230

Kelly & Etling, supra note 228, at 21, 22 (“Democracy requires voting booths, yes, but it also
needs a culture of robust free expression with a tolerance for disagreement and dissent, undergirded by a
general acceptance of certain moral fundamentals, including principles of fairness and equality, and a
sense of shared citizenship and responsibility.”).
231
Balkin, supra note 224, at 39 (“Power to the people—democracy—in its broadest, thickest
sense, must include our relationship not simply to the state but to culture as a whole, to the processes of
meaning-making that constitute us as individuals. Those processes of meaning-making include both the
ability to distribute those meanings and the ability to receive them.”).
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